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Abstract
In December 2019, COVID-19, a novel strain of the SARS-2 Virus, appeared in
Wuhan, China. Within a year, over ninety million people had been infected, and two
million had died. Amid all the death and desolation, humanity’s ingenuity and willpower emerged in history’s greatest vaccine race. The global community sought to
find novel ways to protect innovation and intellectual property while still collaborating to roll out a vaccine in record time. Despite the presence of compulsory licensing
provisions like 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and the Bayh-Dole Act in the U.S., and the TRIPS
Agreement at the international level, the journey has been difficult. Thousands died
while international players protected proprietary information and ensured that their
countries’ citizens are first in line for the vaccine. Although dubbed a “once in a lifetime pandemic,” the COVID-19 outbreak provides a unique opportunity to contemplate ways to unify the world through intellectual property during a time of crisis, as
well as a grim portent of what will become the new norm if we do not.
This Article examines the impact and effectiveness of intellectual property licensing provisions worldwide to suggest improvements that might result in a quicker
and more efficient response to future global health crises. By examining and learning
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from the plagues of the present, we might preserve the health of our future.
I.

Introduction

At a time when Europe dominated the world stage, Prussian diplomat Klemens
Wenzel Furst von Metternich famously remarked, “When France sneezes, the whole
of Europe catches a cold.”1 While this phrase has been modified many times over the
centuries, an increasingly interconnected global economy has forced us to realize that
that phrase is now true for any nation or world power. 2020 proved that if one country
“falls ill,” it is only a matter of time before the rest follow. This realization has
prompted an increased look into how to unite the world in a common defense while
still maintaining the individual rights of nations and their citizens. Unsurprisingly,
with the COVID-19 pandemic ravaging the globe, intellectual property (“IP”) rights
and their roles in helping and inhibiting the race for the cure have come under intense
scrutiny.
Starting with the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,2 and continuing most recently with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”)3 and its amendment, the Doha Declaration,4
the international community has tried to balance the often-countervailing interests of
IP holders and common citizens of the signatory nations. One of the most contested
topics is the IP rights and protections afforded to pharmaceutical innovations. On one
side are the pharmaceutical companies that research, develop, and manufacture treatments for a host of illnesses and diseases. The pharmaceutical industry often acts as
a monolith and advocates for strict IP protections to safeguard patents and competitive secrets.5 Pharmaceutical companies tend to maximize profit margins by prioritizing developing treatments for medical issues that affect large demographics of people with the financial means to pay for treatment.6 Protecting IP is therefore
1
2

3

4

5

6

Alex Lubin, Reading America from the Peripheries, 67 AM. QUARTERLY 219, 219 (2015).
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883) (Oct. 18, 2020), https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html
[https://perma.cc/MN99-FVEY].
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I.C., LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (as amended on Jan. 23, 2017),
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/31bis_trips_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K2YE-DQC3]
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
WORLD TRADE ORG. MINISTERIAL CONF., Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14, 2001), https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/tripshealth.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/PK7Q-ALUD] [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
David W. Opderbeck, Patents, Essential Medicines and the Innovation Game, 48 VAND. L. REV.
501, 519 (2005).
Richard G. Frank & Paul B. Ginsburg, Pharmaceutical Industry Profits and Research and Development,
HEALTH
AFFS.
(Nov.
13,
2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20171113.880918/full/ [https://perma.cc/L8GW-JNEU]; Melanie Newman, Drug Companies are Incentivized to Profit Not to Improve Health, Says Report, 363 BRIT.
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paramount to the industry and is a “bedrock of their business.”7 On the other side are
developing countries, also known as lower-middle-income economies (“LMICs”),8
with citizens who often cannot afford those pharmaceuticals. These nations see strong
IP schemes as a significant barrier to access to pharmaceuticals that their citizens
desperately need.9 Most of the citizens in these LMICs cannot afford to pay hundreds
of dollars for a patented drug, nor can these nations subsidize such treatments sufficiently to protect all, or even a majority, of their citizens. As a result, LMICs have
been forced to look for ways to offset IP rights, such as through compulsory licenses
that allow governments to license protected IP at will.10 The pharmaceutical industry
understandably opposes compulsory licenses and the purported disincentives to innovate that they bring.11 The debate over compulsory licenses is not novel, nor will it
be resolved easily.
The COVID-19 pandemic that started in 2020 brought global attention to this
tumultuous debate. Many private and public research initiatives have tried to develop
vaccines and other treatments to end the global disaster. Conspicuous in this effort
was the minimal collaboration between different actors that all searched for the same
cure. Three significant issues exist, which, thus far, have presented barriers that have
significantly hindered a comprehensive global response to the COVID-19 outbreak
and others in the past. First, on the national level, governments have struggled to enact
and implement legislation that enforces march-in rights against pharmaceutical companies, which has hindered government access to vaccine technology and development. Second, vaccine nationalism and the current competitive international market
have discouraged pharmaceutical companies and vaccine manufacturers from sharing
information and collaborating in meaningful ways that might accelerate vaccine development and distribution. Finally, the lack of access to pharmaceutical-related infrastructure in LMICs has inhibited their response and put their citizens at a considerable disadvantage in terms of priority to receive the vaccine.
This Article will address these issues by first providing a basic understanding of
vaccines, the challenges of creating them, and issues that hinder global vaccine distribution in Part II. Part III will cover existing initiatives in the U.S. and around the
world, including compulsory licensing, vaccine pools, and the 2020 IP Waiver proposal. Finally, Part IV will look for ways to harmonize the disparate pieces of international legislation that deal with compulsory licensing to decrease vaccine

7
8

9

10
11

MED. J. (Oct. 16, 2018), http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.k4351 [https://perma.cc/8T3W-AQ85].
Opderbeck, supra note 5.
World Bank Country and Lending Groups, WORLD BANK (Mar. 13, 2021), https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519 [https://perma.cc/DQM2-QFG6] (defining
lower-middle income economies based on gross national income per capita. It also lists each country
and its categorization).
Sean Flynn et al., An Economic Justification for Open Access to Essential Medicine Patents in Developing Countries, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 184, 188–90 (2009).
Id.
Mansi Sood, Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corporation and the Compulsory Licensing Regime in
India, 6 NUJS L. Rev. 99, 101 (2013).
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nationalism and increase international collaboration for future health crises. It will
propose several novel licensing frameworks with an overall goal of increasing access
to vaccine IP while still promoting rights holders’ interests. These proposals are divided into two categories: non-voluntary licenses and voluntary licenses, based on
the rights-holder’s control over the terms of the license. While this Article emphasizes
non-voluntary licensing, it aims to provide other equitable solutions that balance the
health and safety of the world’s citizens and the IP interests of the pharmaceutical
industry.
II.

Background

In early 2020, COVID-19, a contagious respiratory and vascular disease resulting from an infection of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARSCoV-2),12 took the world hostage. The virus originated in Wuhan province, China,
and began appearing in reportable numbers in humans in December 2019.13 Although
initially slow to react, the Chinese government eventually locked the entire region
down in a quarantine bubble to prevent the virus from spreading to other parts of
China and the world at large.14 Despite these preventive measures, countries across
the world began reporting new cases as early as January 2020.15 On March 11, 2020,
the World Health Organization (“WHO”) categorized the COVID-19 outbreak as a
global pandemic,16 and the world economy ground to a halt as nations scrambled to
lock down and contain the spread.17 A similar scramble occurred in the pharmaceutical industry as large and small drug developers raced to develop vaccines and protect
their IP from infringement through patents.18
Chinese researchers published COVID-19’s genetic sequence on January 11,
12

13

14

15

16

17

18

Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), MAYO CLINIC (Oct. 18, 2020), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/coronavirus/symptoms-causes/syc-20479963
[https://perma.cc/RU5H-ECGF].
Origins of AARS-CoV-2, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/332197/WHO-2019-nCoV-FAQ-Virus_origin-2020.1-eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LJE9-4RJQ].
Andreas Illmer et al., Wuhan Lockdown: A Year of China’s Fight Against the Pandemic, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55628488 [https://perma.cc/844SQN5Y].
Timeline: How the New Coronavirus Spread, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 31, 2020, 1:19 PM),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/31/timeline-how-the-new-coronavirus-spread
[https://perma.cc/E8D4-YBV6].
Timeline of WHO’s Response to COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Dec. 28, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news/item/29-06-2020-covidtimeline [https://perma.cc/4Y8X-G2PE].
Katie Zezima et al., Coronavirus Now a Global Pandemic as U.S., World Scramble to Control Outbreak, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2020, 10:09 PM CDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/coronavirus-global-pandemic-outbreak-spreading/2020/03/11/246998ec-63b6-11ea-b3fc7841686c5c57_story.html [https://perma.cc/RD2G-42TK].
Ana S. Rutschman, The COVID-19 Vaccine Race: Intellectual Property, Collaboration(s), Nationalism and Misinformation, OUTSMARTING PANDEMICS (Elizabeth Kirley & Deborah Porter eds.,
2021) (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5–6), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3656929# [https://perma.cc/RV3K-HBTW].
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2020, and independent pharmaceutical companies and research labs kicked off vaccine research almost immediately.19 By March 2020, the first vaccines entered human
clinical trials in the U.S. and China.20 By April 2020, there were over 115 vaccine
candidates from “almost 80 companies and institutes in 19 countries” that were in
some phase of development or testing.21 As of that date, North America had around
46% of the world’s COVID-19 vaccine research, followed by 34% in Asia and Australia, and 19% in Europe.22 Of those, 72% of the projects were developed by private
developers and the rest were efforts led by academics, the public sector and other
nonprofit organizations.23 The largest national vaccine development initiative was a
public-private partnership between U.S. and private developers codenamed “Operation Warp Speed” that allocated more than $12 billion to vaccine makers.24
The most advanced of these research programs started bearing fruit in December
2020, when Pfizer-BioNtech’s Comirnaty vaccine was approved for emergency use
after passing clinical trials.25 Many countries, including the U.S., bypassed normal
testing protocols and granted emergency approval to immediately administer doses.26
Other vaccines followed, and by March 2021, exactly a year after the WHO declared
the COVID-19 outbreak to be a global pandemic, eleven vaccines were in use worldwide, four of which were approved for widespread use by the U.S. or European Union.27 With reliable vaccines finally making their way out to people across the world,
the focus began shifting away from development and toward timely and equitable
19

20

21
22
23
24

25

26

27

Tung Thanh Le et al., The COVID-19 Vaccine Development Landscape, 19 NATURE REVS. DRUG
DISCOVERY 305, 305 (2020).
NIH Clinical Trial of Investigational Vaccine for Covid-19 Begins, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Mar.
16, 2020), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/nih-clinical-trial-investigational-vaccine-covid-19-begins [https://perma.cc/J85G-AKUY]. Javier Garcia, CanSino Biologics: China Announces First Human Trials of Covid-19 Vaccine, MARKET SCREENER (Mar. 18, 2020, 9:23 AM),
https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/CANSINO-BIOLOGICS-INC59318312/news/CanSino-Biologics-China-announces-first-human-trials-of-Covid-19-vaccine30183232/ [https://perma.cc/7YCF-APZZ].
Charles Schmidt, The Vaccine Quest, 322 SCI. AM. 6, 41 (2020). Thanh Le et al., supra note 19.
Thanh Le et al., supra note 19, at 306.
Id.
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136 (2020). See also Emily
Barone, The Trump Administration’s ‘Operation Warp Speed’ Has Spent $12.4 Billion on Vaccines.
How Much is That Really?, TIME (Dec. 14, 2020, 3:52 PM), https://time.com/5921360/operationwarp-speed-vaccine-spending/ [https://perma.cc/GY56-YB8Y] (stating that as of the writing of the
article, the U.S. government had spent $12.4 billion on Operation Warp Speed).
See Christine Soares & Travis Hartman, Tracking the Vaccine Race, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2021),
https://graphics.reuters.com/HEALTH-CORONAVIRUS/VACCINE-TRACKER/xegpbqnlovq/
[https://perma.cc/ED7T-WSL2](providing information on the progress of COVID vaccines through
clinical trials); Reuters Staff, Fact check: It is standard practice for vaccine safety monitoring to
continue after approval, REUTERS (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-factcheckvaccine-monitoring-idUSKBN2AC2G3.
See Soares & Hartman, supra note 25 (providing that pandemic vaccines have been tested with overlapping phases to compress the timeline and providing that governments intended rapid distribution
on regulatory approval).
Vaccines in Use, COVID-19 VACCINE TRACKER (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.covid-19vaccinetracker.org/authorized-vaccines [https://perma.cc/U3EC-AXZU].
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distribution.
A. Vaccine Primer
A vaccine is a preventive or prophylactic inoculant that aims to “confer immunity against a specific disease, usually employing an innocuous form of the disease
agent . . . to stimulate antibody production.”28 Once enough people in a community
are inoculated, a “herd immunity” sets in that protects and benefits all individuals
within the community, whether they have been vaccinated or not.29
Vaccine candidates go through various tests before being considered safe for
human use.30 First, the candidates are tested in animal studies, then in small controlgroup trials with healthy volunteers, and finally in large-scale trials with slices of the
population representing diverse potential patients.31
B. Infrastructure and Technical Challenges of Creating a Vaccine
Vaccine manufacturing is a challenging and complex process that is both time
and cost-intensive.32 The research and development phase involves many steps, including sourcing and purifying raw ingredients from all across the world, developing
and adding stabilizers and preservatives to maintain the stability of the drug, testing
adjuvants to find one that maximizes the immune response, and packaging the individual doses into vials and syringes for distribution.33 Because of stringent packaging
regulations, the final step, the “fill and finish” of the individual doses, creates a logistical challenge that only a few dozen companies can surmount.34 Of those companies,
less than half a dozen that are primarily located in the U.S., United Kingdom, and
European Union can manufacture active ingredients to the satisfaction of strict quality

28

29

30

31

32

33
34

Vaccine, DICTIONARY.COM (Jan. 10, 2021), https://www.dictionary.com/browse/vaccine
[https://perma.cc/PKW4-EZVN].
C. Jessica E. Metcalf et al., Understanding Herd Immunity, 36 TRENDS IN IMMUNOLOGY 753, 753
(2015).
Barry C Buckland, The Process Development Challenge for a New Vaccine, 11 NATURE MED.
SUPPLEMENT S16, S16-17 (2005).
Amol B. Deore et al., The Stages of Drug Discovery and Development Process, 7 ASIAN J. PHARM.
RSCH. & DEV. 62, 65 (2019); see generally Kavita Singh & Shantanu Mehta, The Clinical Development Process for a Novel Preventative Vaccine: An Overview, 62 J. POSTGRADUATE MED. 4, 4
(2016).
See Stanley Plotkin, Increasing Complexity of Vaccine Development, 212 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES
S12, S12 (2015) (describing key problems in the development of future vaccines); Shyam Rele,
COVID-19 Vaccine Development During Pandemic: Gap Analysis, Opportunities, and Impact on
Future Emerging Infectious Disease Development Strategies, HUM. VACCINES &
IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS
1192,
1192
(2020),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21645515.2020.1822136 [https://perma.cc/LE2LMNCH].
Rele, supra note 32.
Georgina Drury et al., Process Mapping of Vaccines: Understanding the Limitations in Current Response to Emerging Epidemic Threats, 37 VACCINE 2415, 2418 (2019).
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control standards35 at a scale that can meet the global demand for a particular vaccine.36
This complexity creates a specific problem where subtle changes can affect the
safety and effectiveness of the vaccine.37 Because of these high stakes, regulatory
agencies worldwide pay special attention to each pharmaceutical company or manufacturer and the vaccines they create.38 Every stage of development and production is
carefully monitored and tested, and pharmaceutical companies often patent or license
each stage of production to protect their investment.39 These patents on the production
stages, known as process patents, are often so numerous and broad that they present
smaller vaccine developers with a greater barrier of entry into the manufacturing
space than a patent just on the final vaccine composition would.40 Furthermore, the
massive costs of vaccine research and development, paired with the process and product patents, compel pharmaceutical companies to charge elevated prices for the final
product; prices that do not always decline when the patents protecting those vaccines
expire.41
Further complicating the COVID-19 vaccine race is the fact that the leading vaccine candidates are messenger ribonucleic acid (“mRNA”) vaccines.42 mRNA vaccines, and other similar genetic vaccines, combine the immunological properties of a
standard protein vaccine with increased the increased cost effectiveness and longterm stability.43 While this decreases long-term recurring development costs and
promises low-cost manufacture, which are essential traits for a developing vaccine
that would need to be manufactured by the billions, the major drawback of this technology is that it is still rather novel.44 Thus, the manufacturing costs of many components of the vaccine are either being produced in small quantities, or at a high cost.45
These limitations understandably strain COVID-19 vaccine development and production and are felt by consumers who seek inoculation against the virus.

35

36

37
38
39

40
41
42

43

44
45

Thomas J. Bollyky & Chad P. Bown, The Tragedy of Vaccine Nationalism: Only Cooperation Can
End the Pandemic, 99 FOREIGN AFFS. 96, 99 (2020).
Stanley Plotkin et al., The Complexity and Cost of Vaccine Manufacturing – An Overview, 35
VACCINE 4064, 4065 (2017).
Plotkin et al., supra note 36.
Id.
Julie Milstein & Miloud Kaddar, Managing the Effect of TRIPS on Availability of Priority Vaccines,
84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 360, 362 (2006).
Plotkin et al., supra note 36.
See id. (discussing the challenges associated with developing and processing vaccines).
Rele, supra note 32, at 1124 (stating that eighteen of the most developed vaccines that were undergoing preclinical and clinical testing, including Moderna and Pfizer’s, were mRNA vaccines).
See Thomas Schlake et al., Developing mRNA-Vaccine Technologies, 9 RNA BIOLOGY 1319, 1319
(2012) (providing that mRNA-vaccine technologies have the immunological properties of a standard
protein vaccine and are characterized by great flexibility in production and application).
Id. at 1326.
Norbert Pardi et al., mRNA Vaccines — A New Era in Vaccinology, 17 NATURE REVS. DRUG
DISCOVERY 261, 273 (2018).
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1. The Conflict Over Components Between Moderna and Arbutus
This pressure came into the public spotlight in 2019 when Moderna Inc. and
Arbutus Biopharma Corporation—two of the largest pharmaceutical companies in
North America —went to court over IP rights protecting a vaccine component.
mRNA vaccines require a crucial mechanism known as a lipid nanoparticle (“LNP”)
delivery system, for which the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) granted
Arbutus Biopharma Corporation several patents between 2011 and 2016.46 Many vaccine developers, including Moderna, rely on LNPs to ensure that the mRNA in their
mRNA vaccines is properly administered to develop the required antibodies.47 Although Moderna licensed an LNP based mRNA delivery technology from a Canadian
company called Acuitas, Arbutus was the patent holder, not Acuitas.48 Arbutus
promptly terminated Acuitas’ license because Acuitas’ sublicense to Moderna was
improper and obtained a preliminary injunction against Acuitas in Canada, preventing
it from sublicensing the LNP technology to any other entities.49
Acuitas and Arbutus settled and stipulated that Acuitas has no further right to
the LNP technology.50 Also included was a stipulation that Moderna only has access
to the LNP technology for four non-exclusive vaccine sublicenses for vaccines to
target predetermined viral targets.51 A day earlier, Moderna filed a petition at the
USPTO for an inter partes review (“IPR”) against Arbutus’ U.S. Patent No.
9,404,127, which protects an element of the LNP technology.52 The goal was to try
to get the USPTO to invalidate Arbutus’ patent. Moderna prevailed, and the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) rendered a Final Written Decision that invalidated
all of the patent’s claims.53 Two other IPRs against two of Arbutus’s other patents
protecting the LNP technology failed partially or completely.54
46

47
48

49

50

51
52

53
54

Rele, supra note 33, at 3; see also U.S. Patent No. 8,058,069 (issued Nov. 15, 2011); U.S. Patent
No. 9,364,435 (issued Jun. 14, 2016); and U.S. Patent No. 9,404,127 (issued Aug. 2, 2016).
Moderna Loses Key Patent Challenge, 38 NATURE BIOTECH. 1009 (2020).
Derek Lowe, Formulating RNA – and Owning It, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. (July 24, 2020),
https://blogs.sciencemag.org/pipeline/archives/2020/07/24/formulating-rna-and-owning-it
[https://perma.cc/LGK5-5EKY].
Nathan Vardi, Moderna’s Mysterious Coronavirus Vaccine Delivery System, FORBES (July 29, 2020,
7:51 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2020/07/29/modernas-mysterious-coronavirus-vaccine-delivery-system/?sh=b8a040c62d9c [https://perma.cc/FY37-8H6F].
Arbutus Settles Litigation, Terminating Acuitas’ Rights to LNP Technology, ARBUTUS BIOPHARMA
CORP.
(Feb
22,
2018),
https://investor.arbutusbio.com/index.php/node/14131/pdf
[https://perma.cc/ME66-NXWL].
Id.
Moderna Therapeutics, Inc. v. Protiva Biotherapeutics Inc., No. IPR2018-00680 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 10,
2019).
Id.
Moderna Therapeutics, Inc. v. Protiva Biotherapeutics Inc., No. IPR2018-00739 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 11,
2019) (holding that Moderna’s second IPR against Arbutus, which challenged U.S. Patent No.
9,364,435, led the PTAB to invalidate some claims and upholding the validity of others); Moderna
Therapeutics, Inc., v. Arbutus Biopharma Corp., No. IPR2019-00554 (P.T.A.B. July 23, 2020)
(holding that Moderna’s third IPR against Arbutus, which challenged U.S. Patent No. 8,058,069, led
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C. Roadblocks to Domestic and International Vaccine IP Sharing
Moderna and Arbutus’s dispute over vaccine components is one example of a
roadblock that prevents outright sharing, both in the U.S. and globally. Real property
rights in the U.S., especially as they pertain to IP and vaccine development, are a
source of constant consternation for lawmakers. Juggling the countervailing interests
and goals of vaccine developers and citizens is a tall order, especially when certain
situations require that one group be disadvantaged to benefit the other. A 2020 Special
301 Report prepared by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative underscored the
major issues surrounding the intersection of health policy and IP interests.55 Despite
initiatives promoting international collaboration during the COVID-19 crisis, true IP
sharing remains to be seen. Nations look to protect their citizens, and pharmaceutical
companies look to protect their IP and investment. These prevailing interests often
conflict when nations look to pharmaceutical companies for treatment and either want
to protect their native pharmaceutical industries or prioritize treatment for their citizens. This dissonance grows stronger when one considers that LMICs and developed
nations, at times distinguished based on their Gross National Income (“GNI”),56 also
have conflicting views on priority treatment. Two distinct phenomena have presented
significant challenges to global treatment programs during the current pandemic: (1)
vaccine nationalism and (2) resistance to the “anti-capitalistic” behaviors that are IP
sharing and compulsory licensing.
1. The Rise of Vaccine Nationalism
During difficult times, it is natural human instinct for people to focus inward and
prioritize efforts to best help themselves. This is, in effect, a survival mechanism
borne out of the fact that humans are not gifted with an automatic method or tool of
survival that would save them from having to actively work to preserve their own
lives.57 Vaccine nationalism extends this concept on the international level that occurs
when countries seek to obtain preferential treatment for their citizens either by buying
new vaccines first or by refusing to sell vaccines or license vaccine technology until
their citizens have been served.58 Not only does this lead to bidding wars where
wealthier countries have more leverage to induce vaccine developers to help their
citizens first, this also encourages a lack of cooperation and sharing of research and
resources.59 Desperate governments may risk long-term damage to their diplomatic,
economic, and strategic interests in exchange for short-term deals for vaccines or their

55

56

57
58
59

the PTAB to uphold all twenty-two claims of Arbutus’ patent).
Robert E. Lighthizer, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2020 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 36 (2020),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2020_Special_301_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MB4-44KJ].
Espen Beer Prydz & Divyanshi Wadhwa, Classifying Countries by Income, WORLD BANK (Sept. 9,
2019), https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/stories/the-classification-ofcountries-by-income.html [https://perma.cc/2RZX-AQ6Y].
AYN RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS, at 6 (1961) (ebook).
Bollyky & Bown, supra note 35, at 96–97.
Global Governance for COVID-19 Vaccines, 395 LANCET 1751, 1751 (2020).
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technology.60
World leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron, UN Secretary-General António Guterres, and Chinese President Xi Jinping have tried to combat this
instinct by calling vaccines global public goods that are a resource that should be
available to all people regardless of nationality.61 In November 2020, the G-20 signatory countries recognized “extensive immunization as a global public good,” and reaffirmed their resolution to “ensure affordable and equitable access [of the vaccine]
for all people.”62 Although they have expressed intentions of ensuring that the stock
and use of vaccines in any one country would not interfere with its use in another,
initial supply compared to the global demand show that view to be idealistic.63 Earlier
that year, the CEO of Sanofi—one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies—
stated that the U.S. should have the right to the largest pre-order of its COVID-19
vaccine because it contributed significant funding for research.64 It only reversed that
position in the face of worldwide condemnation and criticism.65 A short while later,
in March 2021, Italy blocked the export of 250,000 AstraZeneca doses to Australia,
citing a need to vaccinate citizens in-country first.66 The European Commission, at
Australia’s request, investigated the situation and backed Italy amid growing concerns that European-based pharmaceutical companies were helping countries outside
the bloc without first properly addressing Europe’s needs.67
Unsurprising as the desire to receive preferential treatment for vaccine distribution is, it is increasingly detrimental to global stability, economic growth, and

60
61

62

63
64

65

66

67

Bollyky & Bown, supra note 35, at 97.
Anna Marie Merlo, Macron to WHO: ‘The Vaccine is a Global Public Good’, IL MANIFESTO (May
20,
2020),
https://global.ilmanifesto.it/macron-to-who-the-vaccine-is-a-global-public-good/
[https://perma.cc/A46B-27ZJ]; Corinne Gretler, Xi Vows China Will Share Vaccine and Gives WHO
Full Backing, BLOOMBERG (May 18, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-18/china-s-virus-vaccine-will-be-global-public-good-xi-says [https://perma.cc/X32RKU4N]; UN Chief: COVID-19 Vaccine Must Be Affordable and Available to All, UN NEWS (Sept.
16, 2020), https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/09/1072522 [https://perma.cc/5RLU-BRS4].
Raya Jalabi et al., G20 Leaders Seek to Help Poorest Nations in Post-COVID World, REUTERS (Nov.
21,
2020,
8:43
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-g20-saudi-idUSKBN2810JD
[https://perma.cc/43WE-TWLQ].
Bollyky & Bown, supra note 35, at 98.
James Patton et al., U.S. Likely to Get Sanofi Vaccine First if It Succeeds, BLOOMBERG (May 13,
2020, 4:34 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-13/u-s-to-get-sanofi-covidvaccine-first-if-it-succeeds-ceo-says [https://perma.cc/7ZP2-HGSC].
James McAuley, France Angered by Suggestion U.S. Would Get First Access to Coronavirus Vaccine by French Pharma Company Sanofi, WASHINGTON POST (May 14, 2020, 2:13 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/coronavirus-vaccine-sanofi/2020/05/14/821c7c1295e2-11ea-87a3-22d324235636_story.html [https://perma.cc/FG35-4QR5].
Colin Packham et al., Australia Asks EU to Review Block of AstraZeneca Vaccine, REUTERS (Mar.
4, 2021, 9:42 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-australia/australia-askseuropean-commission-to-review-italys-vaccine-block-idUSKCN2AX07H
[https://perma.cc/U2MW-4A9V].
Id.
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stability.68 IP stability and international collaboration that guarantees a rapid global
vaccine rollout might alleviate pressures from competitive practices and increase public trust in vaccines.
2. Resistance to Compulsory Licensing Due to the Conception
that Such Provisions are Incompatible with Capitalist
Economies
The other major roadblock to IP sharing is the interplay between compulsory
licensing (or IP sharing) and capitalism. In the U.S. and other capitalist economies,
pharmaceutical R&D is mainly funded and carried out by the private sector. It comes
as no surprise that the focus is on profitability, which can be achieved through treatments that heal maladies affecting more people and service more customers. As a
result, vaccine development for diseases that mainly affect people who lack the financial ability to pay for costly medications is often put on hold in favor of medicines
that target people who can afford the costly medications. Over the past two decades,
there has been little to no private-sector research into diseases that run rampant in
LMICs, such as onchocerciasis, leishmaniasis, and schistosomiasis.69 Many of those
infected by these “neglected infectious diseases” cannot afford to pay hundreds, let
alone thousands, of dollars for a name-brand patented drug.70 Even though these diseases cause epidemics that affect millions more people than COVID-19, pharmaceutical companies do not consider curing them profitable enough to warrant research.71
68

Marco Hafner et al., The Global Economic Cost of COVID-19 Vaccine Nationalism 1 (RAND Corp.,
Research Brief No. RB-A769-1, 2020), https://doi.org/10.7249/RBA769-1. The research brief concluded that:
(1) vaccine nationalism could cost the global economy up to $1.2 trillion a year in GDP;
(2) as long as there is no vaccine against the disease, the global cost associated with COVID-19 and its
economic impact could be $3.4 trillion a year;
(3) if the poorest countries cannot access vaccines, the world could still lose between $60 billion and
$340 billion a year in GDP; and
(4) for every $1 spent on supplying poorer countries with vaccines, high-income countries would get
back about $4.80.
69 See generally Germán Velásquez, Trade Agreements, Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines:
An Introduction, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES: PAPERS AND
PERSPECTIVES, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 1 (2010) (discussing the lack of research and the widening gap
on health care inaccessibility); see also Neglected Tropical Diseases, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION (last visited Feb. 21, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/ntd/diseases/index.html. The three diseases listed, along with fourteen others are known as neglected tropical diseases (“NTDs”) because of the lack of treatment available because of unfavorable cost-benefit analyses. The CDC estimates that six NTDs could be controlled or eliminated through targeted vaccine
programs.
70 See Neglected Infectious Diseases, Leishmaniasis, PAN AM. HEALTH ORG. & WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(Feb. 21, 2021), https://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2017/2017-cha-leishmaniasis-factsheetwork.pdf (discussing Leishmaniasis as a one of the top neglected infectious diseases that result in
thousands of deaths each year).
71 Id.; see also Jens Aagard-Hansen & Claire Lise Chaignat, Neglected Tropical Diseases: Equity and
Social Determinants, in EQUITY, SOCIAL DETERMINANTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAMMES 135,
136, 148–50 (Erik Blas & Anand Sivasankara Kurup eds., 2010) (discussing the cyclical nature of
poverty in relation to NTDs and the need for greater subsidization of costs).
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In light of this capitalistic pragmatism, it is understandable that American pharmaceutical companies would balk at compulsory licensing provisions and decry them as
anti-competitive and anti-capitalistic.
Additionally, IP rights encourage the development of new medicines and provide the stability necessary to innovate without fear of wrongful takings.72 Such bedrock protections often make one wary of abridging those rights, no matter the emergency.
The dire circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic encouraged many U.S. lawmakers to consider those risks. In a February 2020 letter, forty-six members of Congress implored former President Donald J. Trump to use every tool at his disposal to
ensure that vaccines were accessible and affordable.73 Notably, this letter requested
that the President deny private manufacturers exclusive licenses to COVID-19 vaccine or treatment IP, and that he authorize the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to step in if a manufacturer priced the byproducts of that innovation
unreasonably.74 These entreaties, and every other since then have met with no success
and no federally mandated licenses.
Balancing capitalist principles, Constitutional rights, and global health needs to
develop an equitable solution is a concept that will be further explored in Part IV.
III.

Existing Initiatives

IP licensing is not a novel concept. Lawmakers in the U.S. and worldwide have
developed a variety of licensing frameworks that grant rights-holders varying levels
of control over their IP and the rights they grant licensees. Legal experts categorize
licenses into two categories—non-voluntary and voluntary licenses—based on a
rights-holder’s control over the license.
Non-voluntary licenses, sometimes referred to as compulsory licenses, allow
rights-holders the least control over the terms of the license.75 Rights-holders cannot
usually control who the IP is licensed to, nor can they generally set the terms of the
license.76 Given the extent to which non-voluntary licenses abrogate a rights-holder’s

U.S. CONST. amend.V. “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty , or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . .”
73 Letter from Jan Schakowsky, Senator, et al. to President Trump (Feb. 20, 2020), http://freepdfhosting.com/20bf1d75af.pdf.
74 Id. at 1.
75 Mark W. Lauroesch, General Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: Good in Theory,
But Not Necessary in Practice, 6 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 41, 41, 48 (1990).
76 See Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the Reality, 33
IDEA 349, 350–54 (1993) (discussing various legal schemes where compulsory licensing takes
place).
72
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property rights, they are almost exclusively issued by governments and find legal
justification in the State’s federal legislation.77
Voluntary licenses, on the other hand, are a form of contract between a rightsholder and a pharmaceutical company, which authorizes the licensee to produce the
patented technology within certain parameters and conditions.78 As the International
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations notes,
[t]he license usually sets quality requirements and defines the markets in which the licensee
can sell the product . . . [and] can be tailored to account for many factors, including the
nature of the epidemic/disease, social factors, economic considerations, and the capacity of
the licensee to meet and maintain quality standards for the product .79

Rights-holders can also use voluntary licenses to define a remuneration plan,
such as a royalty, which the licensee would pay to continue to use the IP.80
This Part will analyze existing non-voluntary and voluntary licensing schemes
in effect in the U.S. and abroad as well as their applications thus far to the COVID19 pandemic. These schemes range from federal legislation to independent initiatives
aimed at incentivizing IP sharing.
A. Non-Voluntary Licensing (Compulsory Licensing)
Compulsory licensing is one of the most powerful tools a government can use
to increase production and distribution of a product when needed and demand outstrips supply—such as during a public emergency. Governments generally authorize
compulsory licenses when a patentee exhibits disagreeable behavior, such as anticompetitive or uncooperative inhibitory practices, during a time of public need.81 By
forcing the patentee to license the patent to the government, a license acts as an “unwilling contract between a willing buyer and an unwilling seller imposed and enforced by the state,” which can affect market exclusivity directly and market price
indirectly.82 Compulsory licenses generally authorize the willing buyer to manufacture, use, or distribute the patented invention without the unwilling seller’s consent.83

77
78

79
80

81
82

83

See id. (discussing the relationship between the state and the inventory)
Voluntary Licenses and Non-Assert Declarations, INT’L FED’N OF PHARM. MFRS. & ASS’NS (July 28,
2010),
https://www.ifpma.org/resource-centre/voluntary-licenses-and-non-assert-declarations/
[https://perma.cc/85SB-JAAM].
Id.
Voluntary Licenses and Access to Medicines, MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES 6, 11 (Oct. 2020),
https://msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/IP_VoluntaryLicenses_fullbrief_Oct2020_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y743-QQHK].
Julian-Arnold, supra note 76, at 350–54.
Srividhya Ragavan, The Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade: The Supreme Court in
PhRMA v. Walsh and the TRIPS Agreement, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 777, 782 (2004) (quoting Paul K.
Gorecki, Regulating the Price of Prescription Drugs in Canada: Compulsory Licensing, Product
Selection, and Government Reimbursement Programmes (Economic Council of Canada 1981)).
Id. at 782–83.
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1. Relevant U.S. IP Legislation Affecting Pharmaceuticals
The U.S., likely due to its strong regard for property rights and its desire for a
clear delineation of government power, has one of the most robust and well-defined
compulsory licensing schemes. Two provisions allow the federal government to issue
a compulsory license: 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212, also known as
the Bayh-Dole Act.
a. 28 U.S.C. § 1498
Of the two, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 is the broadest and grants the government the
greatest powers over domestic IP.84 Originally conceived in 1910 with wartime urgency in mind, the statute grants the U.S. Government, as a function of its sovereign
immunity, the absolute right to practice any U.S. patent without fear of an injunction.85 Congress intentionally gave the government such sweeping authority “to stimulate contractors to furnish what was needed for the War, without fear of becoming
liable themselves to inventors or the owners or assignees of patents.”86 This purpose
was manifested in a 1918 amendment to the 1910 Act, per which the only recourse
available to an infringed patent owner is to sue the U.S. in the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims.87 However, even if they were to do so, § 1498 only entitles them to the recovery of reasonable and entire compensation for the infringing use.88
The statute’s strength comes from the eminent domain aspects, which allow the
government to expropriate IP without fear of injunctions that might halt development
at a critical juncture. Congress originally drafted § 1498 under the lens of dealing
with recalcitrant patent holders in a time of war, where speed is essential to ensuring
an adequate response. Certain distinct parallels, including that need for a rapid response, can be drawn between a war and other major crises, such as a public health
emergency. This is particularly important in a situation like a global pandemic, where
the federal research collective needs to move fast to control the outbreak by developing and rolling out vaccines without worrying about getting bogged down in the judicial system.

84

85

86
87

88

Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-305, 36 Stat. 851 (1910); see also Zoltek Corp. v. U.S., 442
F.3d 1345, 1368–69 (2006) (discussing the Act of 1910 as a precursor to § 1498 and the purpose of
the Act).
Richmond Screw v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 345 (1928); David S. Bloch, Alternatives to Marchin Rights, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 247, 261 (2016).
Richmond Screw, 275 U.S. at 345.
Act of July 1, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-182, 40 Stat. 704, 705; ); see also Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d at
1369–70 (discussing the 1918 amendment to the 1910 Patent Act to not only state that a suit against
the United States in the Court of Federal Claims is the only recourse, but also stating that compensation is to be the only recovery granted. This amendment was later incorporated into 28 U.S.C.
§1498(a) when the act was re-codified by the Act of June 24, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869,
941 (1948)).
28 U.S.C. §1498(a).
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b. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and 35 U.S.C. § 203
The Bayh-Dole Act of 198089 also contains compulsory licensing provisions and
was a retroactive attempt by Congress to address a decline in American innovation. 90
With new patent filings going down year after year, Congress was concerned that
rapidly decreasing domestic technological innovation would put the U.S. behind foreign competitors.91 West Germany and Japan, in particular, were going through innovation booms that concerned legislators considering their industrial might and the
power they brought to bear in the previous World War.92 Congress was also concerned that recent scientific breakthroughs were not being developed and commercialized properly.93 This was because the majority of the scientific research was either
funded or conducted by the federal government.94 Congress wished for the federal
government to have the ability to leverage the results of the research it funded in
actionable ways that improved the country while still incentivizing innovation in the
public and private sector.95 The Bayh-Dole Act was Congress’s attempt to encourage
research and capitalize on developments made with access to federal funds. 96
Through it, the federal government retains a “nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the U.S. any
subject invention throughout the world . . . .”97
35 U.S.C. § 203 codifies the march-in rights conferred by the Bayh-Dole Act
and applies it to patented inventions developed using government funding.98 These
rights allow the government to require that the contractor, assignee, or exclusive assignee (collectively “rights holder”) of such a patent grant a “nonexclusive, partially
exclusive, or exclusive license” to a “responsible applicant or applicants upon terms
that are reasonable under the circumstances . . . .”99 The Act also allowed the government to grant the license itself if the contractor, assignee, or exclusive assignee refuses as long as one of four conditions are met.100 It explicitly carved out health and
89

Patent and Trademark Amendments (Bayh-Dole) Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (1980).
126 CONG. REC. 29,897 (1980).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 126 CONG. REC. 29,896 (1980). See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
ADMINISTRATION OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT BY RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 3 (1998) (“The purpose of
this act was to reform U.S. patent policy related to government-sponsored research. At the time,
fewer than 5 percent of the 28,000 patents being held by federal agencies had been licensed . . . .”).
94 126 CONG. REC. 29,898 (1980).
95 Id.
96 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: ADMINISTRATION OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT
BY RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 3 (1998).
97 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4).
98 35 U.S.C. § 203.
99 35 U.S.C. § 203(a).
100 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1)–(4). § 203 provides these four conditions, any one of which permits the government to issue a license:
(1) action is necessary because the contractor or assignee has not taken, or is not expected to take within
a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject invention in such
field of use;
90
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safety provisions that allowed for licensing, which although relevant to many types
of inventions, is of particular relevance based on its coverage of pharmaceuticals.101
It is important to note several distinctions between the Bayh-Dole Act and 28
U.S.C. § 1498 to show the overlap between the two. Although both laws allow the
rights holder to appeal to the Court of Federal Claims,102 unlike for an issuance under
§ 1498, which cannot be halted, the Court of Federal Claims can affirm, reverse, remand, or modify a government’s license granted under the Bayh-Dole Act.103 For
cases in which march-in rights are asserted on the grounds of § 203 (1) or (3)104, that
power may not be exercised until the rights holder has exhausted all available appeals
or petitions.105 Additionally, the “terms that are reasonable” language of § 203 implies
a royalty to the original rights holder, which § 1498 does not grant when the government leverages a patent.106 A rights holder whose patent was exercised under § 1498
may only seek compensation.107 Finally, § 203’s march-in rights may only be used on
patents developed using government funding, while § 1498(a) has a broader coverage
and applies to all U.S. patents.108 These differences between § 1498 and the BayhDole Act give the federal government flexibility in approaching a potential compulsory licensing situation.
c. Historical Pandemics in the U.S. and the Attempts to
License IP
Although Congress conceived two pieces of legislation that allowed the government to use patents when needed, they have seen little to no use. The federal government only threatened to invoke § 1498 for a pharmaceutical patent once.109 The BayhDole Act has never been used, despite at least six petitions to do so since its enactment
in 1980.110 In each of those situations, the National Institute of Health (“NIH”) declined to exercise the march in rights against the patent holders. For three of the petitions, In re Norvir I, In re Xalatan, and In re Norvir II, the NIH stated that the BayhDole Act does not allow agencies to control drug prices if the drugs are widely
(2) action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or their licensees;
(3) action is necessary to meet requirements for public use specified by Federal regulations and such
requirements are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or licensees; or
(4) action is necessary because the agreement required by section 204 has not been obtained or waived
or because a licensee of the exclusive right to use or sell any subject invention in the United States
is in breach of its agreement obtained pursuant to section 204.
101 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2).
102 28 U.S.C § 1498(a); 35 U.S.C. § 203(b).
103 28 U.S.C § 1498(a); 35 U.S.C. § 203(b).
104 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1), (3).
105 35 U.S.C. § 203(b).
106 35 U.S.C. § 203(a); 28 U.S.C § 1498(a).
107 28 U.S.C. §1498(a).
108 35 U.S.C. § 203(a); 28 U.S.C § 1498(a).
109 See infra Part III.A.1.c.ii.
110 JOHN R. THOMAS, MARCH-IN RIGHTS UNDER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 8 (Cong. Research. Serv. 2016).
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available to physicians or clients, or if the patentee “has taken reasonable steps to
achieve practical commercialization.”111 Similar march-in petition requests in 2001
for Ciprofloxacin after the anthrax scare and in 2018 for Gilead Sciences’ prophylactic HIV treatment Truvada fizzled out before even reaching the NIH.112
i.

2001 U.S. Anthrax Outbreak

The 2001 anthrax outbreak is one of the most compelling examples of when
compulsory licensing rights could have been used but were not. The outbreak occurred shortly after the deadliest terrorist attack in American history and stemmed
from a string of letters that were sent to news outlets and congressional offices.113
These letters contained pores of the deadly airborne pathogen anthrax and caused
over twenty-two infections within a several-week window.114 The pharmaceutical
company Bayer held the patent for the antibiotic prophylactic Ciprofloxacin.115 Bayer
sought to use the widespread panic to leverage the federal government into severely
overpaying for the hundred million doses it wished to purchase.116 After futile negotiations, Bayer only conceded after the Secretary of Health and Human Services at
the time, Tommy Thompson, threatened to override Bayer’s exclusivity rights by licensing the formula to a generics117 manufacturer.118
The Bayer incident set a precedent that gained traction during other health crises and
resulted in other incidents where state governments declared an explicit intention to
invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to lower drug prices during a time of need.
ii.

Louisiana 2017 Hepatitis C Outbreak

Similarly, in 2017, Louisiana was struck by a Hepatitis C outbreak that affected
nearly 35,000 uninsured and Medicaid-dependent residents.119 Gilead’s antiviral
drugs would have cost an uninsured individual an estimated $85,000 each, at a total
111
112

113

114
115

116
117

118

119

Bloch, supra note 85, at 255-57.
Id. at 258; Shefali Luthra, In the Battle to Control Drug Costs, Old Patent Laws Get New Life, KHN
(Oct. 5, 2018), https://khn.org/news/in-the-battle-to-control-drug-costs-old-patent-laws-get-newlife/ [https://perma.cc/TR7Y-5MPZ].
Daniel B. Jernigan et al., Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax, United States, 2001: Epidemiologic Findings, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1019, 1019 (2002).
Id.
Kirby W. Lee, Permitted Use of Patented Inventions in the United States: Why Prescription Drugs
Do Not Merit Compulsory Licensing, 36 IND. L. REV. 175, 175 (2003).
Id.
See generally Generic Drug Facts, FOOD & DRUG AGENCY (Feb. 22, 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/generic-drugs/generic-drug-facts [https://perma.cc/32MJ-33C9]. (The
U.S. Food and Drug Agency (“FDA”) defines a generic pharmaceutical as “a medication created to
be the same as an existing approved brand name-drug in dosage form, safety, strength, route of
administration, quality, and performance characteristics.”).
Thomas F. Mullin, AIDS, Anthrax and Compulsory Licensing: Has the United States Learned Anything – A Comment on Recent Decisions on the International Intellectual Property Rights of Pharmaceutical Patents, 9 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 185, 200–01 (2002).
Sarah Jane Tribble, Louisiana Proposes Tapping a Federal Law to Slash Hepatitis C Drug Prices,
KHN (May 4, 2017), https://khn.org/news/louisiana-proposes-tapping-a-federal-law-to-slash-hepatitis-c-drug-prices/ [https://perma.cc/Y547-6DCV].
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untenable cost of $764 million to the state.120 Interestingly enough, Louisiana’s Secretary of Health, Dr. Rebekah Gee, was also able to force a concession from Gilead
to provide the drugs at a subscription rate by publicizing an intention to invoke §
1498.121 What was most surprising about this concession, however, was that another
coalition’s similar initiative to persuade the NIH to exercise march-in rights and license pharmaceutical company AbbVie’s patent on another Hepatitis C drug for similar reasons failed only four years earlier.122 Apart from focusing on local inaccessibility because of the exorbitant prices, the coalition also focused on the pricing
disparities in different countries based on the differences in healthcare.123 The NIH
found this argument to be unpersuasive: “the extraordinary remedy of march-in is not
an appropriate means of controlling prices of drugs broadly available to physicians
and patients.”124
2. Compulsory Licensing Provisions Worldwide
Compulsory licenses are not a new phenomenon, nor are they a unique feature
of American capitalism. Many countries, like the U.S.,125 developed their own provisions, while others, like Thailand,126 used international treaties as a template. While
many different types of compulsory licensing schemes exist across the world, this
Article will specifically focus on those that impact pharmaceuticals, including those
of the five largest pharmaceutical exporters by dollar value127 and some of the largest
generic pharmaceutical exporters128 by volume. All compulsory licensing schemes
have the same general components, but this Section will focus on some notable differences. This Section will also cover the most binding resolution on global compulsory licensing provisions: the TRIPS Agreement.
Unsurprisingly, as heavy exporters of pharmaceuticals or generics, France,129
120

121
122

123

124
125
126

127

128

129

See Brian R. Edlin, Access to Treatment for Hepatitis C Virus Infection: Time to Put Patients First,
16 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES e196, e196 (2016) (“The list prices for 12-week regimens for HCV
genotype 1 range from US$83 320 to $94 500”).
Tribble, supra note 119.
Charlotte Harrison, NIH Denies March-In Rights on Norvir Patent, 12 NATURE REVS. DRUG
DISCOVERY 898 (2013).
In the Case of Norvir Manufactured by AbbVie, (Nat’l Inst. of Health, 2013) (determination),
https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/March-In-Norvir2013.pdf.
Id.
See supra Part III.A.1.
Patent Act B.E. 2522 [Patent Act 1979], , last amended by Patent Act (No. 3) B.E. 2542 [Patent Act
(No. 3) 1999] (Thai.),
See Daniel Workman, Drugs and Medicine Exports by Country, WORLDS TOP EXPORTS (Feb. 25,
2021), https://www.worldstopexports.com/drugs-medicine-exports-country/ (Germany is the largest
exporter of pharmaceuticals, and its compulsory licensing provisions are explored in Part III.C.4.).
See Hepeng Jia, Chinese Manufacturers Vie for Piece of Outsourcing Pie, 25 NATURE BIOTECH.
1337, 1137 (2007) (“China . . . is already the world’s largest supplier of bulk drug materials, according to the China Pharmaceutical Industry Association”).
Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle [I.P.C.] [French Intellectual Property Code] art. L613-11 - L61322 (Fr.) [hereinafter French Compulsory Licensing Provisions].
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Germany,130 China,131 Switzerland,132 and the Netherlands133 all have strong compulsory licensing schemes that clarify the reasons for granting a license, the entities that
have the power to grant that license, and terms of the license (including the scope,
duration, and remuneration). Of those elements, countries differ most on the reason
for granting a license. Although all allow for licensing for public interest reasons134,
Germany’s patent law takes this to an extreme and allows the Federal Government or
Federal Ministry of Health the power to invalidate patents where “the invention is to
be used in the interest of public welfare.”135 Germany and Switzerland’s patent laws
include specific carve-outs for pharmaceutical patents, insofar as to allow them to be
licensed to be produced for export to beneficiary countries that have insufficient capabilities to deal with public health crises.136 Finally, although many countries allow
licenses where a patent has not been exercised for a certain time period, France allows
licenses where a rights holder does not start to exploit the patent or makes preparations to exploit it in another country.137 The judicial court or government ministry that
hears the case must determine whether this burden is met.138
a. TRIPS Agreement Between WTO Members
Much of the differences in applying these provisions disappeared with the
130

131

132

133

134

135

136
137
138

Patent Act as published on 16 December 1980 (Federal Law Gazette 1981 I p. 1), as last amended
by Article 4 of the Act of 8 October 2017 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 3546)[hereinafter German Patent
Act].
Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm’n Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, rev’d, Oct. 17, 2020, effective Jun. 1, 2021) [hereinafter Chinese Patent Law];
Measures for Compulsory Licensing of Patent Implementation (promulgated by the Order of the Dir.
of State Intell. Prop. Off. No. 64, May 1, 2012, effective March 15, 2012) [hereinafter Chinese Compulsory Licensing Provisions]; Amendment to the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China
(promulgated by the Standing Comm’n Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 17, 2020, effective Jul. 1, 2021),
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-10/18/content_5552102.htm (Mar. 3, 2021)] [hereinafter 2020
Chinese Patent Amendment].
Legge Federale sui Brevetti d’Invenzione [LBI] [Federal Act on Patents for Inventions], Dec. 31,
1955, RU 1955 (Switz.) [hereinafter Swiss Patent Act].
Rijksoctrooiwet 1995 [Kingdom Patents Act 1995] (Neth.), translated in KINGDOM ACT OF 15
DECEMBER 1994, CONTAINING RULES IN RESPECT OF PATENTS (THE DUTCH PATENTS ACT) (Sept. 18,
2009),
https://english.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2013/12/ROW95_ENG_niet_officiele_vertaling_0.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/A963-BX8E] [hereinafter Dutch Patents Act].
French Compulsory Licensing Provisions, supra note 129, L613-17 - L613-18 (allowing for license
for public interest or national economy); German Patent Act, supra note 130, § 24(1); Chinese Patent
Law, supra note 131, art. 49; Swiss Patent Act, supra note 132, art. 40; Dutch Patents Act, supra
note 133, art. 57, 59(1) (allowing for licenses for public interest or national defense).
German Patent Act, supra note 130, § 13(1). See also Gesetz zum Schutz der Bevölkerung bei einer
epidemischen Lage von nationaler Tragweite, Bevölkerungsschutzgesetz [Civil Protection Act],
Mar. 27, 2020, BUNDESGESETZBLATT JAHRGANG Teil I [BGBL. I] § 5(2) no. 5, last amended by Gesetz [G], Nov. 18, 2020, BGBl. I at 18 2397 (Ger.), https://www.buzer.de/gesetz/13847/index.htm
[hereinafter German COVID Act] (granting the Federal Ministry of Health the power to issue licenses under the § 13(1) of the German Patent Act).
German Patent Act, supra note 130, § 85(a); Swiss Patent Act, supra note 132, art. 40(d).
French Compulsory Licensing Provisions, supra note 129, L613-11.
Id. L613-12.

PADMANABHAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

2/11/2022 2:29 PM

Coronavirus, Compulsory Licensing, and Collaboration:
Analyzing the 2020 Global Vaccine Response with 20/20 Hindsight

95

signing of the TRIPS Agreement in 1995. The Agreement, which was one of the keystone accomplishments of the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round, was the first to bind all of
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Member States139 to a universal compulsory
licensing scheme.140 This scheme set out minimum standards of IP protection and
enforcement.141 It also gave the countries flexibility and freedom in how they went
about making their laws TRIPS compliant, as well as in how they implemented and
practiced the Agreement’s provisions, provided that they met those minimum standards.142
Articles 8, 30, and 31 of the Agreement are relevant to compulsory licensing.
Article 8 allows members to “adopt measures necessary to protect public health and
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance . . . .”143
Article 30 grants signatory governments the power to abridge patent rights in limited
ways in some cases.144 Article 31 is the most significant as it contains most of the
compulsory licensing provisions.145 It explicitly allows member countries to issue
non-exclusive, non-assignable, licenses for patented technology without the authorization of the rights holder as long as the country pays adequate remuneration.146 It
also requires that the entity seeking the license first try to obtain a voluntary license
from the rights holder.147 However, Article 31 waives this requirement “in the case of
a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or cases of public
non-commercial use,” as long as the entity seeking the license notifies the rights
holder as soon as reasonably practical.148 Article 31bis, an addition to Article 31, also
allows nations that need patented pharmaceuticals but are unable to manufacture them
to employ compulsory licenses to import them from a producing country while remaining compliant with other TRIPS provisions.149
A significant challenge the WTO faced was how to balance the inequities of the
effects of patents on LMICs and the losses suffered by innovators who had their IP

139

140
141
142

143

144
145
146
147
148
149

Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm [https://perma.cc/H7VB-P94T] (“164 members since 29
July 2016”).
LIGHTHIZER, supra note 55, at 37.
Id at 36.
COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC
HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 21 (2006), https://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf?ua=1
[https://perma.cc/7G3F94W8].
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 8. See also Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of
the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 1008–10 (2009).
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art 30.
Id. art. 31.
Id.
Id.
Id.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 31bis.
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stolen.150 On one hand, requiring WTO members to actively enforce patents and patent holders’ exclusive marketing rights encourages innovation and development by
helping innovators and protecting property.151 On the other hand, it hurts individuals
and countries with restricted purchasing power that cannot afford expensive, patented
technology.152 This inequity is especially prevalent in pharmaceuticals, and while
compulsory licensing allowed countries to increase accessibility through compulsory
licenses, the process to do so is difficult and often very convoluted.153 The WTO
sought to balance these countervailing interests at a Ministerial Conference in Doha,
Qatar at the turn of the century.154
i.

The Doha Declaration

The Doha Declaration, a product of the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the
WTO in 2001, is an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement that went into effect in
2005.155 It reflected the WTO’s intent to “promote access to medicines once and for
all” and address difficulties that “WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector” faced to protect the global public
health.156 The WTO did so by (1) revitalizing compulsory licensing provisions by
including allowances for countries to import and produce generic versions of patented
pharmaceuticals157 and by (2) empowering WTO signatories to exert them when
needed.158
Sections 4 and 5 of the Declaration have the greatest effect on the TRIPS Agreement’s existing compulsory licensing scheme.159 Section 4 emphasizes that the
TRIPS Agreement “does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures
to protect public health.”160 It grants them the flexibility to interpret the Agreement
in a way that supports the goal of protecting public health and promoting public access.161 Section 5 elaborates on some of those flexibilities, most notably granting each
Member the right and freedom to grant compulsory licenses as they see fit.162 It also
150

151

152
153
154
155
156
157

158
159
160
161
162

COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH, supra note 142, at 21 (“Since the
benefits and costs of patents are unevenly distributed across countries, according to their level of
development and scientific and technological capacity, countries may devise their patent systems to
seek the best balance, in their own circumstances, between benefits and costs.”).
Hilary Wong, The Case for Compulsory Licensing During COVID-19, 10 J. GLOB. HEALTH 1, 2
(2020).
COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH, supra note 142, at 22.
Velásquez, supra note 69, at 3.
Doha Declaration, supra note 4.
Id.
Id. at ¶¶ 4, 6.
WORLD HEALTH ORG., PROGRESS ON GLOBAL ACCESS TO HIV ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY: A REPORT
ON “3 BY 5” AND BEYOND 60 (2006).
Doha Declaration, supra note 4, ¶ 4.
See id. ¶¶ 4, 5 (providing members with flexible options for licensing).
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5. See also Carlos M. Correa, Implementation of the WTO Decision on Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, INTELL. PROP. AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES:
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allows Members to determine what qualifies as a national emergency to invoke the
national emergency provisions of TRIPS Article 31.163
International treaties like the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration were
the first major steps to synchronize the demands of the pharmaceutical industry and
the needs of the developing world. Neither side got what they wanted out of it because
although pharmaceutical companies received more IP rights and protections, much of
that was diminished by the Doha Declaration. On the other hand, although LMICs
and their pharmaceutical industries were certainly inhibited by the TRIPS Agreement,
which deprived them of the free rein they enjoyed for many decades, the Doha Declaration restored to those countries the broad latitude to protect their citizens and manufacture generics during emergencies. Analyzing an LMIC with a strong generics
industry would be practical to properly gauge the effects of this legislation.
3. The Effects of Compulsory Licensing and IP Protections on
Global Collaboration and Vaccine Distribution
Like the various national IP regimes discussed above,164 the TRIPS Agreement
imposed a set of guidelines and restrictions that set out a framework for how to protect
intellectual property, albeit on a grander scale that bound all signatory countries of
the WTO.165 The Doha Declaration later amended the TRIPS Agreement and added
in flexibilities, including broader compulsory licensing provisions, that allowed
LMICs to act during emergencies.166 This Section will analyze the impact and effectiveness of these pieces of legislation, both historically, and with respect to the
COVID-19 global pandemic.
a. Use of the National Emergency Provision of the Doha
Declaration
Since the Doha Declaration’s ratification in 2001, many countries’ health ministries have discreetly sought to use compulsory licenses or the threat of imposing
compulsory licenses to decrease local prices of vital medicines.167 In the decade following the ratification alone, seventeen countries have tried to avail themselves of its

163
164
165
166
167

PAPERS AND PERSPECTIVES, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 75, 75–81 (2010). Paragraph 5 extended broad
flexibilities which expanded Member States’ powers to grant compulsory licenses during emergencies. It removed the TRIPS § 31(f) limitation on exports of generics that were obtained under a
compulsory license and also expanded parallel importation provisions. The section also allowed for
unrestricted imports of generics of patented drugs if they were imported by the Member government
for public and non-commercial use if the government negotiated and paid reasonable compensation
to the rights holder.
Doha Declaration, supra note 4, ¶ 5.
See supra Part III.A.2.
See supra Part III.A.2.a.
See supra Part III.A.2.a.i.
Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the
Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 249–50 (2009).
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compulsory licensing provisions.168 This has mainly come in the form of licenses or
declarations of licenses issued under the authority of TRIPS Article 31.169 In November 2006, Thailand’s Ministry of Public Health issued a five-year compulsory license
for the AIDS antiretroviral drug Efavirenz.170 This allowed the government to import
the drug from India and produce a generic version of the drug despite the pharmaceutical company Merck having an active patent that was valid in Thailand.171 This was
just the first of several compulsory licenses that the Thai government issued following
the Doha Declaration’s enactment under the justification of protecting public health
as a WTO member.172 A year later, Brazil followed by issuing a compulsory license
for the same drug to combat a rapidly spreading AIDS epidemic.173 That same year,
Rwanda also issued a license on similar drugs to receive assistance from Canada.174
Although these three incidents may appear to be isolated, there are dozens of similar
issuances from more than twenty countries across the world.175
As common as demonstrations of the power of the Doha Declaration are, albeit
everywhere but the U.S., many governments have found that merely threatening to
enact a compulsory license framework based on the Doha Declaration is just as effective.176 Between 2003 and 2006, several countries including Indonesia, India, Vietnam, and South Korea threatened to enforce TRIPS-based compulsory licenses
against Roche Holding AG to gain access to the anti-viral influenza drug Olsetamivir.177 The threat alone was enough to compel Roche to increase production and select partners to produce the drug under non-exclusive licenses.178
b. Effects on LMICs
The TRIPS Agreement and its compulsory licensing provisions have had positive and negative effects on LMICs. Historically, the TRIPS Agreement has largely
hindered a rapid resolution to pressing health crises. By forcing LMICs to undertake
strenuous obligations to respect foreign IP rights, TRIPS made many drugs

168

169
170

171
172
173
174

175

176
177
178

Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha
Declaration: A Database Analysis, 9 PLOS MED. 1, 4 (2012).
Reichman, supra note 167, at 250.
Robert Steinbrook, Thailand and the Compulsory Licensing of Efavirenz, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED.
544, 544 (2007).
Id.
Id. at 546.
Reichman, supra note 167, at 250.
Gorik Ooms & Johanna Hanefeld, Threat of Compulsory Licenses Could Increase Access to Essential Medicines, BMJ 1, 2 (2019).
JAMES PACKARD LOVE, RECENT EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF COMPULSORY LICENSES ON PATENTS
(Knowledge Ecology Int’l., Research Note 2, 2007).
Ooms & Hanefeld, supra note 174.
Reichman, supra note 167, at 250.
Tove I. S. Gerhardsen, Roche Seeks Deals on Bird Flu Drug as Compulsory Licenses Loom, INTELL.
PROP. WATCH (Oct. 20, 2005), https://www.ip-watch.org/2005/10/20/roche-seeks-deals-on-bird-fludrug-as-compulsory-licenses-loom/ [https://perma.cc/9ASQ-FZ64]. See also Reichman, supra note
167, at 250.
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unattainable for average citizens in those countries.179 South Africa and Brazil are
two examples of countries whose governments have struggled to reconcile compliance with the TRIPS Agreement with the need to protect their citizens from diseases
such as AIDS.180 Before joining the WTO, these and other similarly situated countries
could develop or import generic products at a fraction of the cost to consumers as a
patented equivalent would cost, thus developing a strong market for generic pharmaceuticals.181 Before TRIPS, there would have been little to no repercussions for this
behavior, which pharmaceutical companies considered to be little more than common
IP theft.182 Therefore, it is unsurprising that TRIPS quickly sought to stifle these generic markets by providing safeguards, which, if broken, could subject the infringing
country to fines and sanctions.183 In 1997, the South African Parliament tried to override patent rights and allow compulsory licensing to make AIDS pharmaceuticals
more accessible amid an AIDS epidemic.184 As a response, the U.S. threatened trade
sanctions under TRIPS and only relented in the midst of mounting public political
pressure.185
That being said, however, the Doha Declaration went a long way towards righting the imbalance in power that the original TRIPS Agreement gave developed countries over their less developed neighbors. As mentioned in the previous Section, these
countries have successfully used TRIPS Article 31 within the past two decades to
issue compulsory licenses and bring down costs for critical drugs during severe health
crises like the AIDS epidemic.186 Additionally, a slew of LMICs have found ways to
successfully grow their generics manufacturing industries in compliance with the
TRIPS regime. Brazil, India, and China all leveraged their infrastructure and experience to increase their R&D capabilities and world standing as pharmaceutical exporters.187 Collaboration between Oxford, AstraZeneca and Serum Institute of India to
179

180

181

182

183

184

185
186
187

See Jaime B. Herren, TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents: The Pharmaceutical Industry vs. the
World, 14 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 43, 60 (2009) (discussing how Least-Developed Nations “are unable to utilize compulsory licenses in the traditional sense”); Theresa Beeby Lewis, Patent Protection for the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Survey of Patent Laws of Various Countries, 30 INT’L L.
835, 845 (1996) (“Production in a particular country is problematic in the pharmaceutical industry
because production involves environmental, safety, and regulatory problems.”).
Naomi A. Bass, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries: Pharmaceutical
Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 191, 209–
11 (2002).
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1701
(2008).
Ronald J. T. Corbett, Protecting and Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries, 35 INT’L L. 1083, 1085 (2001).
See Stiglitz, supra note 181 (arguing “one of the main reasons the pharmaceutical industry was
pushing for TRIPS was that they wanted to reduce access to generic medicines”).
Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPS Agreement: Balancing Pills and
Patents, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 941, 952–53 (2000).
Id. at 955–56.
See supra Part III.A.3.a.
Swathi Padmanabhan et al., Intellectual Property, Technology Transfer and Manufacture of Low-
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mass produce a COVID-19 vaccine is only the latest example of that growth.188
c. Global Attempts to License COVID-19 IP
The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic caused one of the most dramatic global policy
shifts in IP in many decades. Many countries that had either shunned implementing
compulsory licensing provisions in the past, or had skirted over the Doha Declaration
since its enactment began looking for ways to federalize vaccine research. France, 189
Germany,190 Chile,191 Ecuador,192 and Canada193 were just some examples of countries whose lawmakers began rolling out resolutions or legislation in early 2020 to
support a compulsory license push for vaccine technology. All adhere to the general
framework laid out in TRIPS Article 31 in that they grant the government the power
to issue compulsory licenses during an emergency on public health grounds.194
The key difference between these pieces of legislation and the emergency compulsory licensing provisions laid out in TRIPS and the codes of the U.S., United Kingdom, and India is that, while functionally similar, they are reactionary in posture and
stem from an active emergency.195 As a result, they tend to err on the side of giving
more absolute power to the government. Ecuador’s resolution, for example, which
the Committee of the National Assembly passed, requires that their President and
Minister of Health provide free or affordable access to COVID-19 related technology
through compulsory licensing.196 Germany’s Act on the Protection of the Population
in Case of Epidemic Situation of National Significance, which modified the original
German Infection Protection Act and German Patent Act, gave the government broad
powers to act in the interest of “public welfare or in the interest of the security of the
Federal Republic of Germany.”197 France and Canada’s acts are similar albeit a little

188

189

190
191

192

193

194
195
196
197

Cost HPV Vaccines in India, 28 NATURE BIOTECH. 671, 671 (2010); COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP.
RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH, supra note 142, at 26.
Agreements with CEPI and Gavi and the Serum Institute of India Will Bring Vaccine to Low-andMiddle Income Countries and Beyond, ASTRAZENECA (Jun. 4, 2020), https://www.astrazeneca.com/media-centre/articles/2020/astrazeneca-takes-next-steps-towards-broad-and-equitableaccess-to-oxford-universitys-potential-covid-19-vaccine.html [https://perma.cc/ELF9-QKCM].
Code de la santé publique [C.S.P.] [Public Health Code] art. L3131-15 (Fr.) [hereinafter French
COVID Act].
German COVID Act, supra note 135.
Proyecto de Resolución N° 896, Marzo 17, 2020, Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados [Chamber of
Deputies] (Chile) [hereinafter Chilean Resolution].
Resolution for Compulsory Licensing of Patents Relating to Coronavirus art. 2, Marzo 20, 2020,
Comisión Especializada Permanente de Educación, Cultura y Ciencia y Tecnología de la Asamblea
Nacional [Education, Culture, Science and Technology Commission of the National Assembly] (Ecuador) [hereinafter Ecuadorian Resolution].
COVID-19 Emergency Response Act, S.C. 2020, c 5, pt. 12 (Can.) [hereinafter Canadian COVID
Act].
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 31.
See supra Part III.
Ecuadorian Resolution, supra note 192, art. 1.
German COVID Act, supra note 135, art. 1 ¶¶ 4–5.
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more specific through use of limiting language like “health disaster”198 and “public
health emergency”199 to define the boundaries of the provisions. The power of these
loosely worded provisions could prove to be daunting to lawmakers interested in implementing them, which provides an impediment to collaboration.
d. India/South Africa Joint Waiver Request
The India/South Africa Waiver to the TRIPS Agreement, which was submitted
to the WTO’s Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights in
October 2020, is an example of a drastic measure.200 In it, India and South Africa
requested that the WTO temporarily suspend IP rights related to COVID-19 technology to expedite vaccine, technology, and medicine development and ensure equitable
distribution.201 Rather than limiting the use of IP to the few rights holders, the suspension would allow entities across the world the ability to innovate simultaneously
and share developments freely.202
Predictably, while this declaration found support among LMICs, high-income
countries like Japan, Canada, Australia, and Switzerland resisted almost immediately
and requested evidence of the TRIPS Agreement and Doha Declaration’s ineffectiveness in resolving the issue.203 The European Union declared that while the TRIPS
Agreement could resolve this issue without a waiver, implementing compulsory licensing provisions would be harder to do than envisioned.204
Opposition to the India/South Africa Waiver largely disappeared when many
countries, including the U.S., France, China, and Japan announced their support for
an IP waiver in May 2021.205 This policy reversal coincided with a host of other
198
199
200

201
202

203

204
205

French COVID Act, supra note189, ¶¶ 8–10.
Canadian COVID Act, supra note 193, pt. 12.
Request for Waiver by India & South Africa, Waiver from Certain Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of COVID-19, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/669 (Oct.
2,
2020),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669.pdf&Open=True
[https://perma.cc/A6F3-Q57M] [hereinafter India/South Africa Waiver].
Id. at ¶¶ 12–13.
Ann Danaiya Usher, South Africa and India Push for COVID-19 Patents Ban, 396 LANCET P1790,
P1790 (2020).
Id.; As Vaccine Roll-Out Begins, WTO Members Intensify Debate Over Policy Solutions, IISD SDG
KNOWLEDGE HUB (Dec. 21, 2020), https://sdg.iisd.org/commentary/policy-briefs/as-vaccine-rollout-begins-wto-members-intensify-debate-over-policy-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/5KPB-KFMV].
Id.
Andrea Shalal et al., U.S. Reverses Stance, Backs Giving Poorer Countries access to COVID Vaccine
Patents, REUTERS (May 5, 2021, 2:10 PM), https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/biden-says-plans-back-wto-waiver-vaccines-2021-05-05/
[https://perma.cc/385XNNKL]; Matthias Blamont, Macron Backs Waiving IP Rights for COVID-19 Vaccines, REUTERS
(May 6, 2021, 7:11 AM), https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/macronbacks-waiving-ip-rights-covid-19-vaccines-2021-05-06/ [https://perma.cc/Q399-DC78]; David
Lawder & Sonali Patel, APEC Ministers Pledge to Expedite Transit of COVID-19 Vaccines, Related
Goods, REUTERS (Jun. 5, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/apec-debate-proposal-
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nations joining India and South Africa to present a revised waiver.206 The revised
waiver differed from the new waiver in a key respect: it limited the effective duration
of the waiver conditions to three years, subject to an extension if necessary at that
three-year mark.207 The previous waiver waived IP rights “until widespread vaccination is in place globally, and the majority of the world’s population has developed
immunity.”208 This indefinite abrogation of rights was a key sticking point for many
of the opponents of the original waiver.209
The India/South Africa Waiver is just the latest example of LMICs trying to
reconcile IP protections and their desire to protect their citizens. In a discussion about
the COVID-19 pandemic, LMICs expressed frustration towards high-income countries’ self-serving approach to the pandemic.210 They specifically highlighted that the
same high-income countries that, on one hand, were buying up as much of the vaccine
as they could, were also opposing initiatives that could increase global manufacturing
and benefit LMICs in a timely and affordable manner.211 Unfortunately this assertion
describes a behavior known as vaccine nationalism212 which has been observed many
times during the COVID-19 pandemic.213 Addressing it will require changes in policy
and legislation, both in the U.S. and around the world. Part IV will present and discuss
proposals to bring about that change.
B. Existing Voluntary Licensing Frameworks
Voluntary licensing is a catch-all term that covers a wide spectrum of licensing
frameworks including paid-up and open licenses—which will be discussed here. The
key commonality between these licenses that makes them voluntary is that the rightsholder can voluntarily choose if and when they enter the license, and whom they enter
it with.214

206

207
208
209

210

211
212
213

214

remove-tariffs-covid-vaccines-medical-prodcuts-2021-06-05/ [https://perma.cc/BSL4-33K4].
Communication from the African Group et al.Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Prop. Rights, Waiver from Certain Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of COVID-19, WTO Doc. IP/C/669/Rev.1 (May 25, 2021),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669R1.pdf&Open=True
[https://perma.cc/BS9Y-DPSM].
Id.
India/South Africa Waiver, supra note 200, ¶ 13.
Arjun Padmanabhan, People or Patents? The COVID-19 IP Waiver & Property Rights During a
Pandemic, COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. BULL. (July 14, 2021), https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletinblog/people-or-patents.
Waiver from Certain Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of COVID-19 – Responses to Questions, WORLD TRADE ORG., (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://docs.wto.org (click “Search” in menu bar; then enter “IP/C/W/672” in the “Document symbol” field; then click the “Search” button; then follow the provided hyperlink for the document).
Id. ¶ 25.
See supra Part II.C.1.
Ingrid T. Katz et al, From Vaccine Nationalism to Vaccine Equity — Finding a Path Forward, THE
NEW ENG. J OF MED. (Apr. 8, 2021), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2103614
See Daniel D. Kim, Voluntary Licensing of Pharmaceuticals: The Strategy Against Compulsory Licensing, 8 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 63, 80–82 (2016) (discussing the leverage voluntary licensing
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The key differences between a paid-up license and an open license are remuneration and restrictions a licensee is subject to. As its name suggests, a paid-up license
“does not require further royalties because some consideration [such as cash] has been
given in advance.”215 Paid-up licenses are also known as royalty-free licenses.216
Open licenses, on the other hand, grant licensees permission to access and redistribute
intellectual property with few or no restrictions.217 Many restrictions that a rightsholder can impose on a licensee in a paid-up licensing agreement are not applicable
in an open licensing agreement. For example, an open license generally allows for
reproductions, modifications, and derivative works, and for licensees to distribute
them as they would the original work.218 Additionally, the open licenses can neither
restrict licensees from selling or otherwise giving away the work, nor can they require
royalties or fees.219 Interestingly, innovators and would-be licensees made use of both
types of licenses during the early stages of the pandemic.
1. Paid-Up and Open Licenses
Through the aforementioned legislation and independent initiatives, the global
community has found several ways to collaborate and share vaccine IP through voluntary licenses. These initiatives typically focus on encouraging technology sharing
without enforcing IP protections like patents that might hinder development. Pledges
to not enforce IP rights during the pandemic for vaccine-related technology gained
popularity once the WHO expressed an interest in forming a patent pool in May
2020.220 Around that time, the WHO and Costa Rica launched the COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) to help make health technologies effective against
COVID-19 accessible to all.221 The initiative encourages voluntary participation in
the “one-stop shop for scientific knowledge, data and intellectual property” as a sign
of social solidarity.222 Participating in C-TAP entails licensing relevant technology to
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216
217

218
219

220

221

222

grants the pharmaceutical company during contract negotiations).
Lydia Steck, THE BASICS OF LICENSING, 20 (Carla Blackman ed., 2009),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/members.lesusacanada.org/resource/resmgr/Docs/publications/BasicsofLicensing.pdf [https://perma.cc/B26N-WXTM].
Id.
Andrés Guadamuz-González, The License/Contract Dichotomy in Open Licenses: A Comparative
Analysis, 30 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 296, 296 (2009).
Id.
Christian H. Nadan, Open Source Licensing: Virus or Virtue, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 349, 352
(2002).
Making the Response to COVID-19 a Public Common Good: Solidarity Call to Action, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (Jun. 1, 2020), https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/solidarity-callto-action/solidarity-call-to-action-01-june-2020.pdf?sfvrsn=a6c4b03d_4 [https://perma.cc/RAR2GJWD].
International Community Rallies to Support Open Research and Science to Fight COVID-19,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 29, 2020), https://www.who.int/news/item/29-05-2020-internationalcommunity-rallies-to-support-open-research-and-science-to-fight-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/C98Q-8572]
Id.
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the Medicines Patent Pool223 and promoting open innovation models and technology
transfer initiatives like the Open COVID Pledge.224 More than forty WHO Member
States indicated support for C-TAP and the Solidarity Call to Action.225
Like the Medicines Patent Pool, the Open COVID Pledge is a repository for
vaccine-related IP that rights holders can license to the repository through an “Open
COVID License 1.0.”226 Under this license, the pledgor grants a “non-exclusive, royalty-free, worldwide, fully paid-up license (without the right to sublicense)” for the
“sole purpose of ending the ‘COVID-19 Pandemic’. . . and minimizing the impact of
the disease, including without limitation the diagnosis, prevention, containment, and
treatment of the COVID-19 Pandemic.”227 The license also precludes the pledgor
from asserting regulatory exclusivity use of the licensed IP, and from seeking injunctive or regulatory relief for the same purpose.228 Dozens of international corporations,
including Facebook, Amazon, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, and NASA JPL agreed to license their IP under these terms.229
Notably absent from the abovementioned list are pharmaceutical companies. Patent pools and IP pledges hold great appeal among LMICs, but not so much among
wealthier countries such as the U.S. and not among pharmaceutical companies. The
IFPMA opposed patent pools and pledges in May and October 2020 when it determined those initiatives to be misguided and an attack on IP rights.230 Instead, these
223

224

225

226
227

228
229

230

Launch of the COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP), MEDS. PATENT POOL (May 29, 2020,
5:00-6:30 PM), https://medicinespatentpool.org/news-publications-post/launch-of-the-covid-19technology-access-pool-c-tap/ [https://perma.cc/J7DD-J8W9].
WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 222. Two of C-TAP’s stated goals are to (1) “Licens[e] any potential treatment, diagnostic, vaccine, or other health technology to the Medicines Patent Pool – a
United Nations-backed public health body that works to increase access to, and facilitate the development of, life-saving medicines for low- and middle-income countries” and (2) “[Promote] open
innovation models and technology transfer that increase local manufacturing and supply capacity,
including through joining the Open Covid Pledge and the Technology Access Partnership (TAP).”
Endorsements of the Solidarity Call to Action, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct 1, 2021),
https://www.who.int/initiatives/covid-19-technology-access-pool/endorsements-of-the-solidaritycall-to-action
About Us, OPEN COVID PLEDGE (Sept. 30, 2021), https://opencovidpledge.org/about/.
Open COVID License 1.0 March 31, 2020, OPEN COVID PLEDGE (Mar. 31, 2020), https://opencovidpledge.org/v1-0/ [https://perma.cc/8L4Q-4U9H].
Id.
Diana Peters & Eric Steuer, Creative Commons Is Now Leading the Open COVID Pledge—Here’s
What That Means, CREATIVE COMMONS (Aug. 27, 2020), https://creativecommons.org/2020/08/27/cc-ocp/ [https://perma.cc/3NCD-26SZ]. See also Statement by Moderna on
Intellectual Property Matters during the COVID-19 Pandemic, MODERNA (Oct. 8, 2020, 6:39 AM),
https://investors.modernatx.com/news-releases/news-release-details/statement-moderna-intellectual-property-matters-during-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/67C4-CMVA]. Moderna made a similar independent pledge to license its intellectual property.
IFPMA Statement on “Intellectual Property and COVID-19”, INT’L FED’N OF PHARM. MFRS. &
ASSOCS. (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.ifpma.org/resource-centre/ifpma-statement-on-intellectualproperty-and-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/48BU-WQVB]; IFPMA Statement on the “Solidarity Call
to Action to Realize Equitable Global Access to COVID-19 Health Technologies Through Pooling
of Knowledge, Intellectual Property and Data”, INT’L FED’N OF PHARM. MFRS. & ASSOCS. (May 28,

PADMANABHAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

2/11/2022 2:29 PM

Coronavirus, Compulsory Licensing, and Collaboration:
Analyzing the 2020 Global Vaccine Response with 20/20 Hindsight

105

pharmaceutical companies and developed countries have turned to procurement initiatives such as COVAX.231
On June 4, 2020, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI),
in partnership with the Global Vaccine Alliance (Gavi), launched COVAX. 232
COVAX is a pillar of the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator that works
in partnership with over 172 developed and LMICs to speed up the search for an
effective vaccine for all countries.233 It is the only global initiative partnering with
governments and manufacturers to deliver vaccines to both higher-income and lowerincome countries worldwide.234 Like the other patent pools, COVAX has a mechanism through which it procures IP related to vaccines to ensure fair and equitable
access to the vaccines for each participating economy: the COVAX Facility.235 Where
the COVAX Facility differs, however, is that it is a subsect of a larger organization
(COVAX) that acts as a procurement mechanism for countries to get the vaccine,
rather than just a pledge or license facilitator.236 COVAX has likely received more
support than the Open COVID Pledge and C-TAP because it provides more protections for IP rights and does not simply take rights away from the rights holders.
The COVAX initiative represents a step in the right direction, but the most important question is how to make organizations like COVAX more efficient to ensure
quicker responses to future pandemics. Although the WHO declared the COVID-19
outbreak to be a pandemic on March 11, 2020,237 the Vaccine Alliance only launched
the precursor fundraising instruments for COVAX three months later, on June 4.238
In fact, even if COVAX had been formed on the same day the WHO declared
COVID-19 to be a pandemic, it would still have been long overdue. This is because
before March 11, significant time and resources that could have been used in
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2020), https://www.ifpma.org/resource-centre/ifpma-statement-on-the-solidarity-call-to-action-torealize-equitable-global-access-to-covid-19-health-technologies-through-pooling-of-knowledge-intellectual-property-and-data/ [https://perma.cc/X63R-3P87].
Maria Serebrov, Biopharma Opts for Collaboration, Not Patent Pools, BIOWORLD (Aug. 25, 2020),
https://www.bioworld.com/articles/496984-biopharma-opts-for-collaboration-not-patent-pools
[https://perma.cc/EG3Z-VAUM].
Steve Usdin, COVAX Created to Try to Avoid Global Bidding Frenzy for COVID-19 Vaccines,
BIOCENTURY (Jun. 16, 2020), https://www.biocentury.com/article/305466/covax-created-to-try-toavoid-global-bidding-frenzy-for-covid-19-vaccines [https://perma.cc/6AAZ-LKA6].
172 Countries and Multiple Candidate Vaccines Engaged in COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.who.int/news/item/24-08-2020-172countries-and-multiple-candidate-vaccines-engaged-in-covid-19-vaccine-global-access-facility
[https://perma.cc/P396-WFRD].
Id.
Id.
Serebrov, supra note 231.
Timeline of WHO’s Response to COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 18, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news/item/29-06-2020-covidtimeline [https://perma.cc/4Y8X-G2PE].
Usdin, supra note 232.
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international collaborative efforts had already been expended.239 Prior to the formation of COVAX, the U.S. had spent more than $2.1 billion supporting Johnson &
Johnson, Moderna, and AstraZeneca’s vaccine efforts.240 While it is hard to say
whether the result would have been different, it can be argued that contributing $2.1
billion towards a concerted and collaborative international initiative would have
likely yielded actionable results far sooner than spreading the investment across three
companies.
2. Current COVID-19 Alliances
In recognition of the existential threat COVID-19 posed to Asia, the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), comprising of Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, Singapore, and Brunei, along
with China, Japan and Korea, convened the “Special ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit on the Coronavirus Disease 2019” in mid-April 2020.241 In a Declaration, the
Association expressed its commitment to
[f]urther strengthen public health cooperation measures to contain the pandemic and protect
the people, including, inter alia, through timely and transparent exchange of information on
real time situation and pandemic response measures taken by Member States, sharing of
experience and best practices in epidemiological research and development, clinical treatment, joint research and development of vaccines and anti-viral medicines, enhancing capacity for the public health systems of ASEAN Member States while protecting and ensuring the safety of public health workers.242

The Association also expressed an intent to consider creating a standard operating procedure for public health emergencies and bolster national and regional epidemic preparedness and response by creating a network of experts, a network of
emergency operations teams, and a biological pathogen response center.243 Unfortunately, seven of the ten members of ASEAN are categorized as lower or lower-middle
income economies by COVAX.244 These countries lack the capital and infrastructure
239

240

241

242

243
244

See supra Part II (indicating that significant vaccine research began in January 2020 when Chinese
researchers published COVID-19’s genetic sequence. Over 115 vaccine candidates were in various
stages in development less than a month after COVAX was formed, and most of those had expended
significant resources before the formation of COVAX).
Explaining Operation Warp Speed, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. (Dec. 12, 2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/fact-sheet-operation-warp-speed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U78D-N72T].
See generally Joint Statement of the Special ASEAN Plus Three Summit on Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19), ASSOC. OF SE. ASIAN NATIONS (Apr. 14, 2020), https://asean.org/storage/2020/04/Final-Joint-Statement-of-the-Special-APT-Summit-on-COVID-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PNW-YD69].
Declaration of the Special ASEAN Summit on Coronavirus Disease 2019(COVID-19), ASSOC. OF
SE. ASIAN NATIONS, ¶ 9(i) (Apr. 14, 2020), https://asean.org/storage/2020/04/FINAL-Declarationof-the-Special-ASEAN-Summit-on-COVID-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/22L5-DBNF] [hereinafter
ASEAN Declaration].
Id.
AMC-Eligible Economies, COVAX, 5 (Dec. 15, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/covid/pr/COVAX_CA_COIP_List_COVAX_PR_15-12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3ZFGAEKS]. 92 Low– and Middle–Income Economies Eligible to get Access to COVID-19 Vaccines
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to develop their own vaccines, so while they can implement safety protocols, they
depend on the rest of the world for the vaccine.245 This forces them to rely on the
goodwill of the nations actually developing the vaccine to inoculate their citizens.246
Also of note are collaborative initiatives between international pharmaceutical
developers and generics manufacturers. In June 2020, British-Swedish pharmaceutical giant AstraZeneca contracted with the world’s largest vaccine manufacturer, Serum Institute of India, to supply one billion doses of its vaccine, Covishield, to lowand-middle-income countries.247 As mentioned above, this initiative has already seen
results, with India shipping out millions of Covishield vaccines to over a dozen countries in January 2021 alone.248
While these different initiatives have their merits, the lack of a centralized response presents a particular problem that, paired with the pharmaceutical industries’
reluctance to weaken IP rights, has LMICs looking for more drastic means of licensing crucial technology.
IV.

Proposals for New Licensing Schemes to Address Future
Pandemics

According to chair of the Gavi Board, Dr. Ngozi Okonio-Iweala, the COVID19 pandemic has caused “the most severe contraction of the global economy since
World War Two,” with a resultant “terrible impact on the poorest and emerging economies.”249 As this is a global pandemic, the response to it must also be global. International collaboration is critical to resolving the crisis as soon as possible by ensuring
that all countries have access to the vaccine. However, global access to the vaccine is
only the first step, because, while that may resolve this particular pandemic, it does
not protect the world from being held hostage by the next global health emergency.
This Section will discuss the merits of five proposals aimed at improving international collaboration and vaccine distribution for this and future pandemics: (1)
forming a Trilateral council that can implement TRIPS compulsory licensing provisions, (2) enhancing state “march-ins” during domestic emergencies, (3) retroactively
remunerating R&D costs, (4) incentivizing voluntary licensing as an alternative to
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through Gavi COVAX AMC, GAVI (July 31, 2020), https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/92-lowmiddle-income-economies-eligible-access-covid-19-vaccines-gavi-covax-amc
[https://perma.cc/4DHZ-UYAW].
GAVI, supra note 249.
Id.
ASTRAZENECA, supra note 188.
Sanjeev Miglani, Vaccine Diplomacy: India Seeks to Rival China with Broad Shipments, REUTERS
(Feb.
7,
2021),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-india-diplomacyidUSKBN2A70C8 [https://perma.cc/V86V-5HLD].
92 Low– and Middle–Income Economies Eligible to get Access to COVID-19 Vaccines through Gavi
COVAX AMC, GAVI (July 31, 2020), https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/92-low-middle-income-economies-eligible-access-covid-19-vaccines-gavi-covax-amc
[https://perma.cc/4DHZUYAW].
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compulsory licensing, and (5) increasing competition through non-exclusive voluntary licenses. Proposals #1 and #2 relate to non-voluntary licensing because the rights
holders don’t choose when a government would abrogate their rights. Proposals #3,
#4, and #5 are alternatives to compulsory licensing that allow the rights holders the
ability to decide when they license their IP.
A. Non-Voluntary Licensing Proposals
Despite the plethora of compulsory licensing provisions available to them including the TRIPS Agreement, developed countries’ governments rarely issue compulsory licenses, and have only done so a scant few times for pharmaceuticals. As
collaborative as the process to create TRIPS was, there is still fierce opposition to
implementing TRIPS compulsory licensing provisions. The U.S. leads the charge
against TRIPS compulsory licensing.250 This is primarily because it believes that
compulsory licensing disincentivizes the research and development of new technologies, which will diminish new medicine creation and availability in the future. 251
Critics of the provisions, who succeed at blocking compulsory licensing schemes
more often than not, also view government-sanctioned infringement of IP rights as a
slippery slope that could lead to governments being more willing to abrogate property
rights in the future.252
These are valid concerns. The decades following the TRIPS Agreement’s enactment have provided ample evidence of a trend that suggests that governments, especially in LMICs, are becoming more cavalier with their use of TRIPS compulsory
licensing provisions.253 The flexibilities in the Doha Declaration that allowed countries to choose how and when to implement compulsory licenses directly empowered
this uptick in use. Having the ability to issue a compulsory license and actually issuing that license are two different matters entirely, and history has shown that governments flexing that power frequently encounter adverse consequences. For seven decades between 1923 and 1993, Canada had a compulsory licensing scheme that granted
compulsory licenses for all patented medicines in the country.254 Unsurprisingly, this
had a marked negative effect on pharmaceutical development. Pharmaceutical innovators stopped patenting inventions in Canada because generics manufacturers would

250
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253
254

Bass, supra note ,180, at 200.
Id. See also Serebrov, supra note 231 (“IFPMA Director General Thomas Cueni said expecting
companies to give up their intellectual property for SARS-CoV-2 vaccines showed a lack of understanding. ‘In the history of IP, there’s never been a need for compulsory licensing of vaccine patents,’
he noted. ‘IP is a fundamental part of our industry.’ Astrazeneca plc Executive Director and CEO
Pascal Soriot agreed. ‘And if you don’t protect IP, then essentially there’s no incentive for anybody
to innovate.’”).
See generally 145 CONG. REC. H6027–30 (daily ed. July 21, 1999). See also Siraprapha Khim
Rungpry, Compulsory Licensing Issues and Trends in Asia, 2 PHARM. PAT. ANALYST 681, 681
(2013).
See supra Part III.A.3.a.
Sheldon Burshtein, Sublicense or Supply Agreement? Supreme Court of Canada Interpretation Benefits Generic Pharmaceutical Industry, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 73, 74–75 (1999).
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take the most lucrative formulas from the patents and outcompete the inventors. 255
This practice ceased only when Canadian lawmakers recognized that the provision
clashed with the newly signed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.256
It is important to note, however, that effective as the Canada compulsory licensing scheme is at serving as a warning of the perils of issuing compulsory licenses
recklessly, it was a unique situation. Studies have shown no link, apart from rare situations like this one, between using compulsory licenses and a decline in R&D or
innovation.257 In fact, to the contrary, a study of German patents and inventions following World War I found that new or renewed patents increased year-over-year in
fields with licensing and decreased year-over-year in fields without licensing.258 Similar increases in innovation, or a lack of a decrease in innovation, also occurred in
other countries following their implementation of a compulsory licensing scheme.259
While this certainly should not serve as an endorsement for governments to enforce
compulsory licenses often and with reckless abandon, it should help assuage the concerns of lawmakers who are more circumspect in their willingness to enforce such
provisions. It is clear, however, that no two situations or crises are the same, and a
one-size-fits-all approach to abridging IP rights will cause more problems than it resolves. Proposals for improving collaboration therefore must be flexible and adaptable to the specific situation at hand.
1. Proposal #1: Form an International Council that Can
Implement TRIPS Provisions
Although the TRIPS Agreement includes provisions for dealing with crises, no
provisions dictate how to formulate a global response to a worldwide health disaster
like COVID-19. It is therefore on individual countries and alliances to determine how
best to unify to challenge the threat. This approach is flawed, and the lack of brightline rules and guidance results in countries handling the threat in their own ways,
rather than as a global collective. It is therefore imperative that the WHO work with
other intergovernmental organizations to form a governing body that can address
worldwide disasters and coordinate a united response against them. In June 2021, the
WHO, WTO, and World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) announced an
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Id. See id. (stating that “innovators complained that the compulsory licensing system resulted in
inadequate compensation . . . and discouraged pharmaceutical research in Canada.”)
Kristina M. Lybecker & Elisabeth Fowler, Compulsory Licensing in Canada and Thailand: Comparing Regimes to Ensure Legitimate Use of the WTO Rules, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 222, 226 (2009).
See generally Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853 (2003) (concluding
based on many case studies from the U.S. and abroad that compulsory licensing does not harm innovation).
Joerg Baten et al., Does Compulsory Licensing Discourage Invention? Evidence from German Patents After WWI 16–19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21442, 2015).
Chien, supra note 257, at 857.
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intensified partnership to tackle COVID-19.260 This proposal advances a more robust
collaboration effort between those organizations, and others, with broader latitude of
authority during pandemics.
COVAX has yielded significant results in a relatively short time frame, which
by itself proves the benefit and need for similar initiatives for future outbreaks. To
maximize their efficiency, these organizations must be formed and operational far
before a virus reaches pandemic proportions. The ASEAN Special Summit Declaration was a faster response, but ASEAN lacked the resources to seize on its foresight.261 Although the Doha Declaration of TRIPS empowers individual member
states to grant compulsory licenses and determine what constitutes a national emergency, the Declaration falls short by failing to include provisions to unite the world
in situations that would constitute an international emergency, such as the COVID19 outbreak.262 A method of remedying this shortcoming would first be to establish a
council that has the mandate to form a global initiative and enact TRIPS provisions.
Second, this council would have the power to declare a pandemic to be an international emergency that warrants compulsory licensing and collaboration.
a. Future Initiatives
While the TRIPS Agreement has the foundation to facilitate compulsory licensing strategies that can help the world during global health crises, the WHO lacks a
governing body that can implement them efficiently when such crises do arise.263 The
Doha Declaration empowers member states to make decisions regarding compulsory
licensing without providing provisions to assist in forming international initiatives
like COVAX.264
The international community could largely remedy this deficiency by modifying the
TRIPS Agreement to form a body that can act and implement compulsory licensing
provisions to collate research initiatives from around the world once a pandemic has
been identified. COVAX and the ASEAN Special Summit are examples of ongoing
initiatives that can serve as templates for a permanent body that achieves the same
goal. As of now, 194 states have accepted the WHO’s Constitution and become Member States that are bound by it and the TRIPS Agreement.265 The Agreement could be
260
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264
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Directors General of the WHO, WIPO, and the WTO Agree on Intensified Cooperation in Support
of Access to Medical Technologies Worldwide to Tackle the COVID-19 Pandemic, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (Jun. 24, 2021), https://www.who.int/news/item/24-06-2021-directors-general-of-who-wipoand-the-wto-agree-on-intensified-cooperation-in-support-of-access-to-medical-technologies-worldwide-to-tackle-the-covid-19-pandemic [https://perma.cc/R23K-QKZS].
See supra Part III.B.2.
See Doha Declaration, supra note 4 (recognizing the rights to grant compulsory licenses and determine what constitutes a national emergency, but remaining silent as to international emergencies).
See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3 (providing a framework for handling compulsory
licensing).
See Doha Declaration ¶ 5(b), supra note 4 (explicitly recognizing each members “the right to grant
compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are
granted”).
Countries, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 10, 2021), https://www.who.int/countries/
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modified to include a provision that forms a body with intentions like those laid out
in the ASEAN Special Summit Declaration266 and mechanisms of meeting those goals
like those of COVAX and Gavi.267
To act effectively, the body would first need to determine whether a given emergency qualifies as a pandemic. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) defines an epidemic as, “an increase, often sudden, in the number of cases of
a disease above what is normally expected in that population in that area.”268 A pandemic is an epidemic or multiple epidemics that occur over a wide area and cross
international boundaries to usually affect a large number of people.269 Next, rather
than wait for the WHO to analyze data from different countries, countries could bring
forward motions to categorize public health emergencies as pandemics to trigger
compulsory licensing provisions. This would be analogous to an Article 5 Resolution
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).270 In an Article 5 Resolution proceeding, a signatory country may bring forward an incident or situation and the North
Atlantic Council can determine whether it qualifies as an armed attack that requires
a collective defense from every member.271 Invocation of Article 5 requires the unanimous consent of all twenty-eight signatories.272 Following the 2001 attack on the
World Trade Center in New York, the U.S. invoked Article 5 and NATO agreed to
eight measures to help the U.S., including its first ever anti-terror operation using
assets from thirteen signatory countries.273
Global pandemics are attacks against all countries that plague the world as a
whole. Thus, a united and common defense is paramount. With a TRIPS addendum
like Article 5, countries could present their health ministries’ data on growing public
health threats and request an international response that could be analyzed by member
countries based on their own epidemic data and voted on accordingly. The biggest

266
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268

269
270
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[https://perma.cc/CSL4-KRNH].
ASEAN Declaration, supra note 242 ¶ 9(i).
172 Countries and Multiple Candidate Vaccines Engaged in COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.who.int/news/item/24-08-2020-172countries-and-multiple-candidate-vaccines-engaged-in-covid-19-vaccine-global-access-facility
[https://perma.cc/P396-WFRD].
OFFICE OF WORKFORCE AND CAREER DEV., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
PRINCIPLES OF EPIDEMIOLOGY IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE, 1-72 (3d ed. 2012),
https://www.cdc.gov/csels/dsepd/ss1978/SS1978.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HSP-P68U].
Id. See also Pandemic, A DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY (6th ed. 2014).
See North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (allowing each country
“in an exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense” the ability to take actions it deems
necessary to “restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”).
Id.
The Mechanics of NATO’s Collective Self–Defense, STRATFOR WORLDVIEW (Mar. 25, 2015, 8:00
AM),
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/mechanics-natos-collective-self-defense
[https://perma.cc/L3J8-J7GZ].
Collective Defense – Article 5, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Nov. 25, 2019, 11:12 AM),
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm [https://perma.cc/EX6J-MACR].
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hurdle to invoking Article 5 is the requirement that consent be unanimous.274 This
would be nearly impossible in an organization with 194 members; however, in this
situation, a simple majority might suffice to invoke a common-health defense. In the
instances in which such a resolution was invoked, or the WHO declared the emergency to be a pandemic, the body would have the power to implement compulsory
licensing provisions across all signatories and form a task force to handle the specific
threat.
2. Proposal #2: Empower U.S. States to Exercise March-In Rights
During Domestic Emergencies
As previously mentioned, march-in rights have never been used successfully in
the U.S.275 Whether this is because of a lack of precedent or a learned helplessness
where legislators feel no desire to fight a prolonged battle with large pharmaceutical
companies, the fact remains that key IP legislation is not being used at a time when it
is needed.
Although an obscure power, states should use sovereign immunity to enforce
“march-in” rights during public health crises. Sovereign immunity and government
federalism, as general principles guaranteed to state governments under the Constitution, prevent states from being liable for patent infringement so long as they offer
sufficient compensation.276 In the landmark case Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, the Supreme Court upheld these
protections and struck down Congressional attempts to limit them.277 In 1992, Congress passed the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act and
amended U.S. Code to strip states of their sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment protections during patent infringement suits.278 Although the Federal Circuit
agreed with Congress on the matter,279 the Supreme Court determined that Congress
had exceeded its Article I authority280 and that
a State’s infringement of a patent, though interfering with a patent owner’s right to exclude
others, does not by itself violate the Constitution. Instead, only where the State provides no
remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement of their
patent could a deprivation of property without due process result.281

This holding invalidated 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) and secured states’ rights to sovereign immunity after exercising march-in rights. Despite this, these rights have never
274
275
276
277
278

279

280
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STRATFOR WORLDVIEW, supra note 272.
See supra Part III.A.1.c.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643 (1999).
Id. at 630.
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230,
4230 (1992); 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994), invalidated by Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
1998), aff’g 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997), rev’d, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 636.
Id. at 643.
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been used, not even by Louisiana during the 2017 Hepatitis C scare.282 Encouraging
states to enforce these rights within reason, or at least look into doing so, during public health crises would relieve pressure from the federal government. Doing so would
also allow states to respond to unique situations, such as a surge in infections in their
state, on a situation-by-situation basis so that crisis hotspots are addressed quickly
with tailored solutions. Finally, during crises like the COVID-19 pandemic, granting
local manufacturers licenses obtained from enforcing march-in rights might bring relief to beleaguered state economies.
B. Voluntary Licensing Proposals
Voluntary licensing is another option that, if leveraged properly, can achieve the
same goal as compulsory licenses while avoiding much of the ill will associated with
a government having to step in and infringe on a citizen’s property rights. The three
following proposals are designed to encourage rights-holders to issue licenses voluntarily for compensation or as a method to stay competitive in a capitalist economy.
1. Proposal #3: Retroactive Remuneration of R&D Costs for
Proportional Licensing Rights
Proposal #3, which builds on economic remuneration theories, would incentivize licensing through funding already completed research using a subscription plan.
Subscription plans, like the “Netflix subscription model,” guarantee an unlimited supply of a product in return for a fixed reimbursement.283 Although implementing such
an arrangement in an IP-related matter may seem ill advised, the idea has merit and
has been successful thus far.284 In 2019, Louisiana, the first state to successfully
launch such an initiative to treat Hepatitis C, signed an agreement with Asegua, a
Gilead subsidiary.285 Asegua agreed to provide the state with an unlimited amount of
the drug Epclusa for five years at a set price.286 Washington followed suit later that
year by signing a contract with AbbVie for a similar drug following a blind bidding
process.287 Other pharmaceutical companies, including Merck & Co. and Gilead, also
bid.288
This suggestion advocates for allowing the government to apply the Netflix subscription model to retroactively pay for a portion of the R&D costs the patent holders

282
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288

See supra Part III.A.1.c.ii.
Mark R. Trusheim et al., Alternative State-Level Financing for Hepatitis C Treatment—The “Netflix
Model”, 320 J. AM. MED. 1977, 1977 (2018).
JoNel Aleccia et al., Pharma Sells States on “Netflix Model” to Wipe Out Hep C, SCI. AM. (Oct. 31,
2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/pharma-sells-states-on-netflix-model-to-wipeout-hep-c/ [https://perma.cc/F3HL-8RRM].
Hepatitis C Innovative Payment Model Contract with Asegua Therapeutics LLC, LA. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & DEP’T. OF CORR. 1, 2 (effective July 1, 2019).
Id. at 10.
JoAleccia et al., supra note 284.
Id.
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incurred in developing the relevant IP. In return, the government could license the
patent to manufacturers to populate a proportional market share of the patented technology. To illustrate, assume that Company X spent $1 billion to develop the drug
“Xcure.” The proposed plan would allow the government to pay a fixed amount, say
30% of the $1 billion in a subscription plan over a predetermined period. In return,
the government would be allowed to license Xcure technology to other manufacturers. The main restriction on the license would be that the total produced pharmaceuticals across all the licensees are capped at 30% of the market share. If Company X
signed a contract with the government to vaccinate 80% of the population, the licensees could collectively vaccinate 30% of that 80%. Similarly, if the government contracted Company X to produce 1,000,000 doses of Xcure, the license would allow the
licensees to produce 300,000 of those 1,000,000 doses.
This system would benefit the government in that it could pay for proven and
successful research over a period of time. It would also allow the government to act
as a licensor, thereby allowing it to set price caps for the licensee manufacturer(s),
which would defray the remuneration costs. The public would benefit from a faster
product rollout from multiple manufacturers working on the same product. Finally,
although the patent holders would lose opportunity costs of profiting off that percentage of the market, remuneration of the R&D costs would ensure that it did not completely lose those initial investments.
2. Proposal #4: Incentivize Voluntary Licensing as an Alternative
to Compulsory Licensing
Although the Trilateral Initiative from Proposal #1 would have the power to implement compulsory licensing provisions across all signatory countries, patent rights
holders should have a way to adjust their business models to collaborate during a
health crisis without being forced to do so by the proposed governing body. This
Article advances a proposed “inducement package” of three incentives that a rights
holder would be guaranteed should they voluntarily license their IP during a global
health crisis.
First, should a rights holder choose to issue a non-exclusive voluntary license,
they would have a guarantee that their IP would be used in good faith by reputable289
licensees. Unlike an Open COVID Pledge license,290 the license would be restricted
to reputable licensees. These licensees would be actors that the WIPO vetted and approved based on a history of respecting IP rights and dealing in good faith with other
rights holders. Because potential licensees would need to be approved to receive the
license, the license would be non-sublicensable. Licensees would also be subject to
unscheduled audits or inspections to ensure that the rights holder’s IP is protected and
leveraged properly. The WIPO would essentially act in a function like the National

289

290

Reputable in this context would refer to licensees who deal in good faith and could be trusted to not
violate the terms of the licensing agreement.
See supra Part III.A.3.c.
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Intellectual Property Administration of China (CNIPA) in its handling of open licenses,291 although the WIPO would have a greater remit to enforce IP rights’ protections across the world. As a method of enforcement, the WIPO would be able to strip
a licensee of its license in the case of non-compliance with those protections.
Second, the WTO would facilitate favorable terms for the rights holder to procure raw materials for research and for its own vaccine production network. Consistently procuring suitable raw vaccine components is a challenge, and failure to do so
inhibits vaccine development and manufacturing.292 Raw materials and vaccine components must be available and consistent for long periods of time to ensure that the
vaccine is available long enough to not only recover research and development costs,
but also net the developer a profit.293 For this reason, pharmaceutical companies generally wait until the vaccine passes clinical trials and is approved by the relevant regulatory body before establishing resource supply lines and product delivery chains.294
Even though Pfizer and its German partner BioNTech SE started mass production
well before the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approved the vaccine
in December 2020, material bottlenecks prevented the companies from meeting their
end-of-year goal of delivering 100 million doses of its COVID-19 vaccine by fifty
million doses.295 If a rights holder were to voluntarily license IP relevant to the present
crisis, the WTO would work with countries that source the raw components to ensure
a steady pipeline of consistent raw materials. The WTO would also negotiate to decrease the cost of those materials to increase profit margins and provide a competitive
benefit to that particular rights holder over others who did not opt to voluntarily license. This increase in profit margins would also help offset the rights holder’s lost
opportunity cost from not exclusively servicing the entire market.
Finally, the WHO would, as a function, compensate the rights holder for its research and development costs and pay a royalty for the license. Research and development costs drive up the prices of vaccines.296 Those high costs are also why companies are reluctant to share IP.297 This final incentive should help alleviate that
concern by providing the rights holder a guaranteed method of receiving a return on
its investment. Because research and development costs are so high, the WHO might
be best served by paying in installments in a plan like the previously discussed Netflix
model.298 It would also pay a flat royalty fee, like those granted by other countries,
291
292
293
294

295
296
297
298

2020 Chinese Patent Amendment, supra note 131, ¶¶ 16–18.
Plotkin et al., supra note 36.
Id.
Costa Paris, Supply-Chain Obstacles Led to Last Month’s Cut to Pfizer’s Covid-19 Vaccine-Rollout
Target, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pfizer-slashed-its-covid-19-vaccine-rollout-target-after-facing-supply-chain-obstacles-11607027787
[https://perma.cc/LHE8ZDFN].
Id.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
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throughout the term of the license.299 The question becomes who would pay for the
rights holder’s R&D compensation and royalty. Nobel Peace Prize winner Dr. James
Orbinski once suggested a tax on international drug sales to fund a public research
body.300 While this would seem feasible, an international defense fund is a tried and
tested solution for which there already is precedent. Each year, NATO’s member
countries agree to a civil and military budget which they fund according to an “agreed
cost-sharing formula based on Gross National Income.”301 This idea of an annual
budget, supported by member states contributing a percentage of their GNI, would be
easily adaptable to create an international health defense fund where all members of
the WHO contribute a percentage of their GNI to support research initiatives during
a health crisis.
Together, these three incentives would protect a potential licensor’s IP rights
from illegal infringement, increase profitability by decreasing production costs, and
subsidize research and development costs. This would make a strong case for a licensor to voluntarily license relevant IP during a crisis rather than risk a government
enforcing a compulsory license against them. This is also a better option than differential pricing, where pharmaceutical companies price the same drug differently
across markets, which various industries have found to be unfeasible in the past.302 If
this inducement package fails, a strong council with the ability to enforce global compulsory licensing provisions—as discussed earlier in this Part—would still ensure that
collaboration is the primary directive during a health crisis.
3. Proposal #5: Increase Competition Through Non-Exclusive
Voluntary Licenses
The final proposal models a framework that promotes open licenses during public emergencies and would achieve a similar goal as compulsory licensing would
without forcefully infringing on IP rights. Nonexclusive licenses already exist as a
function of current IP schemes and allow a rightsholder to grant licenses to multiple
actors.303 Gilead granted eleven Indian companies nonexclusive voluntary licenses to
produce the HIV/AIDS drug Tenofovir in return for a 5% royalty on sales.304 For the
current pandemic, Gilead granted nonexclusive licenses to generics manufacturers in
299
300
301

302

303
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Steinbrook, supra note 170. See also 35 U.S.C. § 203(a).
Velásquez, supra note 69, at 5.
NATO Agrees 2021 Civil and Military Budget, N. ATL. TREATY ORG. (Dec. 17, 2020, 8:21 AM),
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_180185.htm#:~:text=NATO%20Allies%20have%20agre
ed%20the,%E2%82%AC1.61%20billion%20for%20202 [https://perma.cc/2YBB-B62J].
See Patricia M. Danzon, Differential Pricing of Pharmaceuticals: Theory, Evidence, and Emerging
Issues, 36 PHARMACOECONOMICS 1395, 1401, 1404 (2018) (“[I]n LMICs where most consumers
pay out of pocket for drugs, simple differential pricing appears to fail”). See also Patricia M. Danzon
& Adrian Towse, Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals: Reconciling Access, R&D and Patents,
3 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 183, 193, 201 (2003) (concluding that “actual price differentials are not optimal”).
Understanding Non Exclusive Licensing, LAWS (Dec. 23, 2019), https://patent.laws.com/patent-protection/non-exclusive-licensing [https://perma.cc/YAD6-8FWN].
Steinbrook, supra note 170, at 546.
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Egypt, India, and Pakistan to develop the Hepatitis C drug Remdesivir, which has
been successful at treating COVID-19, for distribution in 127 low-income and lowermiddle-income countries.305 Voluntary licenses like Gilead’s are uncommon because
it is far more profitable for pharmaceutical developers to sell their own brand-name
drugs.306 In fact, Gilead made the COVID-19 Remdesivir licenses royalty-free until
the WHO ends the Public Health Emergency of International Concern, or “until a
pharmaceutical product other than Remdesivir or a vaccine is approved to treat or
prevent COVID-19, whichever is earlier.”307 One distinction, however, between
Remdesivir and other COVID-19 research is that, although Gilead obtained a patent
for the drug’s uses against coronavirus,308 Remdesivir is a repurposed drug—it was
originally developed for Hepatitis C in 2009, and is effective against several families
of viruses.309 Thus, it would be reasonable to think that income from Remdesivir’s
uses against other viruses, which are not royalty free and not subject to voluntary
licenses, may have offset the loss of income from the royalty-free non-exclusive
COVID-19 licenses. This would make the Remdesivir license framework an anomaly, not the norm, and would indicate the lack of incentives for another pharmaceutical company to adopt this approach regarding its COVID-19 related IP.
China recognized the unpalatability of non-exclusive licenses for innovators and
developed an open-license framework that incentivized innovators to open their licenses for non-exclusive use. In a 2020 amendment to its patent legislation, the fourth
since it was enacted in 1984, the National People’s Congress approved an open license system for patents.310 Under this system, if a patent holder expressed to the
government a willingness to license its patent to anyone who asked, it could set the
terms of the fees and would receive government support to openly license the patent.311 Other entities could then pay the fees and use the license.312 Most importantly,
305
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Voluntary Licensing Agreements for Remdesivir, GILEAD (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.gilead.com/purpose/advancing-global-health/covid-19/voluntary-licensing-agreements-for-remdesivir
[https://perma.cc/UT6X-KUF4]. (Gilead promotes using voluntary licenses and has expressed an
intent to continue doing so throughout the COVID-19 pandemic).
Cf. Press Release, Daniel O’Day, Chairman & CEO, Gilead Sciences, An Open Letter from Daniel
O’Day
(Jun.
29,
2020),
https://www.gilead.com/news-and-press/press-room/press-releases/2020/6/an-open-letter-from-daniel-oday-chairman—ceo-gilead-sciences
[https://perma.cc/78U2-GUGB] (stating that a five-day treatment of Remdesivir would cost developed country governments $2,340 per patient) with Andrew Hill, Minimum Costs to Manufacture
New Treatments for COVID-19, 6 J. OF VIRUS ERADICATION no. 2, 2020, at 61, 62 (estimating a fiveday treatment of Remdesivir, sans non-drug components such as saline, would cost manufacturers
$4.65).
GILEAD, supra note 305.
U.S. Patent No. US 10,251,898 B2 (filed Feb. 22, 2018).
Michael K. Lo et al., GS-5734 and Its Parent Nucleoside Analog Inhibit Filo-, Pneumo-, and Paramyxoviruses, 7 SCI. REPS. 1, 2 (2017).
2020 Chinese Patent Amendment, supra note 131, ¶¶ 16–18.
Id. ¶¶ 16–17 (explaining that the patent holder must be willing to grant issue a voluntary license to
anyone who asked and accepted the patent holder’s fee terms to be granted an open license).
Id. ¶ 17.
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however, the Amendment encourages patent holders to issue open licenses by promising a reduction or exemption of annual fees for those who do.313
Proposal #5 advocates for introducing legislation that permits federal governments to encourage non-voluntary licensing of pharmaceutical IP during predetermined situations of national emergency. The legislation would first allow for automatic implementation when the government declares a national health emergency. At
that point provisions would allow patent holders to request the federal government’s
support in regulating an open license of the relevant patents until the emergency was
resolved, or, like in the Gilead Remdesvir licenses, until another technology was developed that better addressed the situation. The government would also encourage
patent holders to seek those licenses, regardless of the lost opportunity cost of not
exploiting the technology themselves. These incentives would vary depending on the
situation but could include annual patent fee exemptions, retroactive remuneration of
research costs, or tax concessions. Patent holders would still retain their rights, and
although they would suffer opportunity costs, incentives would make open licenses
more palatable than compulsory licenses.
V.

Conclusion

There is a lot of uncertainty surrounding compulsory licensing provisions and
how to use them. State and national governments often consider compulsory licensing
to be a nuclear option, and rightly so. The decision to abridge an individual’s rights
to their property should not be taken lightly, especially in a democracy that protects
those rights in every other regard. However, in an increasingly interconnected world
where hostile pathogens can traverse sovereign borders, the initiatives to fight them
must be able to do the same. COVID-19 and other public health disasters do not wait
for anyone, nor do they discriminate in who they strike down: rich or poor, American,
French, or Indian. Prevailing over these diseases, requires input from the best and
brightest each country has to offer.
Science has come so far in the past few centuries, and breakthroughs are happening now at a rate far faster than ever before. Before COVID-19, the mumps vaccine was the fastest vaccine ever developed, taking four years from initial research to
licensing in 1967.314 The COVID-19 vaccine took just under a year to undergo the
same process and begin rolling out on a massive scale.315 Despite all this development, the question remains, “how can we do better?” As monumental and historic as
the COVID-19 vaccine race was, it may have ended faster if the international community had shared research and IP sooner. It is understandable that innovators should
laud IP protections and curse compulsory licensing schemes. It is also understandable
313
314

315

Id. ¶ 17.
Nsikan Akpan, Why a Coronavirus Vaccine Could Take Way Longer than a Year, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/04/why-coronavirus-vaccine-could-take-way-longer-than-a-year/#close. [https://perma.cc/Z9RH-ATN8].
Sandy Cohen, The Fastest Vaccine in History, UCLA HEALTH (Dec. 10, 2020), https://connect.uclahealth.org/2020/12/10/the-fastest-vaccine-in-history/ [https://perma.cc/JYK2-WHPW].
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that LMICs and the disadvantaged should do just the opposite. However, there is a
way to find equitable solutions that do not altogether disadvantage one side in favor
of the other. While the TRIPS Agreement and the IP frameworks LMICs used before
TRIPS reflected a bias towards one side or the other, it is important to recognize how
far those types of legislation have come. The amended TRIPS Agreement certainly
reflects an intent to seek middle ground.
That spirit of cooperation must continue, and must transcend legal policy into
reality. Fostering IP exchanges to collaborate against health disasters like COVID-19
must be the world’s primary directive going forward. Whether it be through encouraging voluntary licenses, enforcing compulsory licenses, or another method, global
actors like countries and private pharmaceutical developers must be prepared to engage in discourse to share knowledge and information pertaining to treatment or
cures. While there is no telling when the next global pandemic will emerge, there is
one certainty: it will come, and a rapid, unified response must meet it. Only by examining and learning from the plagues of the present can we preserve the health of our
future.

